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I. Introduction
Be sober, be vigilant; because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion,
walketh about seeking whom he may devour.
- 1 Peter 5:81
For more than one hundred years, protecting trust principal while
generating the highest income possible marked the fundamental purpose of
fiduciary investment standards.2 In keeping with this purpose, trust doc-
trine evolved throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to forbid
speculative fiduciary investments.3 Because traditional trust doctrine caused
ultimate liability for losses to the trust to sit like a devil on the shoulder of
every trustee, the threat of losses encouraged investments in low-risk
ventures only 4
Today, however, it is the corrosive effects of inflation that create the
greatest threat for trustees.5 Increasingly, low-risk, interest-bearing securi-
ties fail to keep pace with inflation, and thus, inflation becomes the roaring
lion, walking about, seeking to devour the trust.6 Unfortunately, the
traditional restrictions on fiduciary investment largely remain in place.7
Such restrictions now hamper a trustee's ability to be vigilant against this
new adversary - the devil of inflation.8
1. King James version.
2. See Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modem
Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV 87, 93 (1990) (explaining that "prudent person rule"
primarily focused on preservation of trust capital and production of income).
3. See mfra notes 25-43 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of trustee invest-
ment standards).
4: See Loren C. Ipsen, Trends in the Liability of Corporate Fiduciaries, 24 IDAHO L.
REV 443, 443 (1988) (describing traditional focus of trust law as avoidance of risk rather than
maximization of return).
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, introduction (1992) (explaming that modem
experience with inflation differs greatly from that in formative periods of trust investment law
and now dictates greater sensitivity m trust management to competition between principal and
income interests).
6. See infra note 52 (discussing limitations of interest-bearing investments).
7 But see infra notes 244-93 and accompanying text (comparing statutes that have
adopted less restrictive fiduciary investment standards).
8. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27
REAL PROP PROB. & TR. J. 407, 412 (1992) (concluding that arbitrary restrictions on invest-
ment inhibit exercise of sound judgment by skilled trustees); see also Stephen P Johnson,
Note, Trustee Investment: The Prudent Person Rule or Modem Portfolio Theory, You Make the
Choice, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv 1175, 1177 (1993) (claiming that stricter views of prudent
investment deter trustees from doing best possible job for beneficiaries); cf. David R. Levin
et al., Balancing Prudence and Risk: Under ERISA, Pension Plan Investors Must Focus on
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The Restatement (Third) of Trusts emerges in response to tius chal-
lenge. Drawing heavily from current investment techniques, it seeks to
reformulate trust doctrine so that trustees may be flexible enough to avoid
the effects of inflation.9 This effort takes shape m the form of the Restate-
ment (Third)'s "prudent investor rule.""0  Given the importance of the
investment function to fiduciary admimstration, an understanding of this
new standard for prudent investing is essential.
In Part II, this Note provides a brief overview of the historical evolu-
tion of fiduciary investment standards." Part m1 provides an introduction
for laypersons to the central features of modem portfolio theory - the
conceptual foundation of the prudent investor rule.' Part IV demonstrates
the recent progression of trust doctrine by reviewing the fundamental
changes made by the Restatement (Third)."3 Part V.A considers the practi-
cal application of the prudent investor rule by using it to revisit three
prominent fiduciary investment cases."4 Part V.B assesses the effect of the
new standard by reviewing the statutory response to the Restatement (Third)
among the states. 5 Part VI concludes by discussing recent demographic
trends that make the use of trusts more important than ever. Part VI then
recommends that state legislatures quickly move to adopt legislation reflect-
ing the standards of the prudent investor rule so that trustees have the
flexibility needed to respond effectively to those trends. 6
HI. The Evolution of Fiduciary Investment Standards
A. Foundations of the Prudent Man Standard
England greatly influenced the development of "prudent" trustee invest-
ment practices in nineteenth-century America."' The English fiduciary
Participants' Goals, 82 A.B.A. J. 76, 76 (1996) (noting that one goal of any investment
program is to beat inflation); Mark Suzman, Survey of Charity Fund Investment, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1995, at 32 (explaining that, like other fiduciaries, trustees for charitable funds must
protect assets against inflation and generate income for spending).
9. See RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) OFTRUSTS, introduction (1992) (describing incorporation
of modem portfolio theory into Restatement (7lurd)).
10. See id. § 227 (creating "General Standard of Prudent Investment," otherwise referred
to as prudent investor rule).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV
14. See infra Part V.A.
15. See ifra Part V.B.
16. See infra Part VI.
17 See Bruce Stone, The Prudent Investor Rule: Conflux of the Prudent Man Rule with
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investment standard was the product of financial disaster, and it worked
primarily to protect beneficiaries from losses caused by speculative trust
mvestments."i By the early nineteenth century, the English standard cen-
tered on the notion that only government securities, such as British
consols, 9 offered enough safety to merit investment by trustees. 2° As a
developing nation, America could not successfully import this standard
because it had no government-backed securities of equivalent rating to
British securities.2' Consequently, America initially experienced a shortage
of investments like those considered appropriate for English fiduciaries.'
This shortage encouraged the majority of American fiduciaries to direct
their investments toward promoting nascent industrial enterprises instead.23
As a result, it became necessary for American courts to consider whether
Modem Portfolio Theory, EST. PLAN. &ADMIN. 1993, at 9, 11-12 (PLI Tax L. & Est. Plan.
Course Handbook Series No. 229, 1993); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 1175 (describ-
ing influence of England's historically conservative fiduciary rule m America).
18. See Bubble Act, 1719, 6 Geo., ch. 18 (Eng.) (enacting restrictions on fiduciary
investments following collapse of South Sea Company); see also J. Alan Nelson, Comment,
The Prudent Person Rule: A Shield for the Professional Trustee, 45 BAYLOR L. REV 933,
938 (1993) (recalling that English rule limiting trustees solely to investments backed by
British government came m response to famous collapse of South Sea Company, "which
ruined thousands of investors").
19. Webster's defines a consol as "a perpetual interest-bearing obligation first issued
by the British government in 1751." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
UNABRIDGED 484 (1981). Black's defines a consol as a "bond that never matures but is
redeemable on call." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 308 (6th ed. 1990).
20. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 88 (contrasting American standard with early nine-
teenth-century British standard liming trustees to investment in government securities); see
also Nelson, supra note 18, at 938 (explaining that passage of Bubble Act limited English
trustees to investments in securities backed by British government); Stone, supra note 17,
at 11-12 (confirming that British rule approved only government-backed securities as
investments for trust portfolios).
21. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1175 (explaining that, m early nineteenth-century
America, there were no government securities of equal rating to British consols); see also
Nelson, supra note 18, at 938 (noting that American case law on fiduciary investment soon
diverged from English case law because of high risks associated with investing m securities
backed by American government).
22. See Ipsen, supra note 4, at 444 (noting how dearth of investment-grade govern-
ment securities continued into post-Revolutionary War period); see also Mayo Adams
Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 493 (1951) (describing how eco-
nomic conditions m America led to shortage of "safe" fiduciary investments commonly
available m England).
23. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1175 (explaining that majority of early nineteenth-
century American fiduciaries invested funds in this nation's new industrial enterprises).
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American trustees could participate in a more expansive range of trust
investments. 24
In Harvard College v Amory,' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts rejected the conservative British approach.' In so doing, the court
formulated the "prudent man rule" for trust investments.' The Harvard
College court concluded:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct
himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs,
not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition
of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable
safety of the capital to be mvested. s
24. See Stone, supra note 17, at 11-12 (explaining that lack of American equivalent
to British government securities obligated American courts to consider whether trustees
should enjoy more expansive range of trust investment options); cf. Johnson, supra note 8,
at 1175 (concluding that shortage of "safe" fiduciary investments m America necessitated
judicial definition of fiduciary investment standard).
25. 26 Mass. 446 (1830).
26. Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 465 (1830) (finding that trustees acted
prudently when investing in stocks of manufacturng and insurance companies). In Harvard
College, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether trustees acted
imprudently by investing portions of a trust fund, established for the maintenance of the
decedent's wife during her life, in manufacturing and insurance company stocks. Id. at 446-
53. According to the Harvard College court, these investments were not imprudent invest-
ments because all investments place capital at risk. Id. at 461. Consequently, "[a]ll that
can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise
a sound discretion." Id. In Harvard College, the testator authorized the trustees to invest
in "other stock." Id. (emphasis omitted). Given that shares in manufacturing and insurance
corporations fell within that description, the contested investments were acceptable. Id. at
462. Despite the fact that those stocks later fell m value, the trustees were not liable to the
legatees for any depreciation because neither beneficiary objected to the investments when
originally made. Id. at 464-65. Consequently, the trustees did not act with gross neglect
or willful mismanagement. Id. at 465; see also John A. Taylor, Massachusetts'Influence
in Shaping the Prudent Investor Rule for Trusts, 78 MAss. L. REv 51, 53 (1993) (explaining
that Harvard College court rejected conservative British approach m order to give American
fiduciaries greater latitude in investment decisions).
27 See Leslie Joyner Bobo, Comment, Nontraditional Investments of Fiduciaries: Re-
examining the Prudent Investor Rule, 33 EMoRY LJ. 1067, 1072 (1984) (analyzing Harvard
College decision). Bobo noted: "The [Harvard College] court, however, recogmzed that
property management in America had always been necessarily speculative. In pronouncing
there were no 'safe' investments, the court led the way toward fiduciary investments which
could be imaginative yet fruitful." Id., see also Taylor, supra note 26, at 53 (commenting
that Harvard College decision enunciated prudent man rule for trustee investment and
required that trustees act faithfully and with sound discretion).
28. Harvard College, 26 Mass. at 461.
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The court premised tis more flexible standard on the understanding that,
regardless of a trustee's actions, the capital of a trust is always at risk.29
Provided that a trustee used good judgment and care, he could employ any
category of investment, including more speculative holdings like common
stocks.30 As a result, by 1830 American fiduciaries enjoyed greater latitude
in investment decisions than did their British counterparts.31
This departure from trust doctrine's historical conservatism was not
long lived. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the courts refined the
prudent man rule, and in subsequent decisions, the broad principles estab-
lished in Harvard College narrowed into unreasonably specific rules. 2 For
example, m the landmark case of King v Talbot,33 the New York Court of
Appeals concluded that it was imprudent for trustees to invest in corporate
stocks.34 Concerned with the economic instability caused by the post-Civil
29. See Stone, supra note 17, at 12 (observing that Harvard College decision recog-
nized omnipresent threat of risk with respect to trust capital).
30. See id. (noting Harvard College court's recognition that more flexible standard of
trustee action, embracing all forms of investment, could exist within bounds of good
judgment and care).
31. C. Johnson, supra note 8, at 1176 (commenting that purpose behind adoption of
prudent man rule was to give fiduciaries greater latitude m investment decisions).
32. See Stone, supra note 17, at 12-13 (illustrating how increase in litigation against
trustees allowed American appellate courts to shape prudent man rule into more narrow and
unreasonably specific rules than those that developed immediately after Harvard College
decision); cf Taylor, supra note 26, at 55 (noting that Massachusetts became minority view
of prudent man rule as other states made their standards more rigid); James R. Wade, The
"New" Prudent Investor Rule, 20 COLO. LAW. 713, 713 (1991) (noting that Restatement
(Third) reflects idea that original prudent man rule became narrow and restrictive under
prior trust doctrine and case law).
33. 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
34. King v Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 88-91 (1869) (holding that speculative investing by
trustees violates their primary duty). In King v. Talbot, the New York Court of Appeals
considered whether the trustees overseeing a trust created for the benefit of the decedent's
minor children were liable for losses caused by investments m certain stocks. Id. at 87
Following the testator's death, the trustees invested $45,000 in federal treasury notes and
state bonds. Id. at 78. Later, the trustees took the profits from these investments and
purchased canal company, railroad, and bank stocks. Id. The beneficiaries later rejected
those stock investments. Id. at 80. In rendering its decision, the New York Court of
Appeals explained that the duty of a trustee is to employ the same diligence and prudence
as he would employ in his own affairs. Id. at 85-86. This duty necessarily excludes all
speculative investments. Id. at 86. Investments in stocks remove the trust principal from
the control and discretion of the trustees and thereby violate the trustees' primary responsi-
bility. Id. at 88-89. Consequently, the court concluded that the trustees were not at liberty
to invest in the canal company, railroad, and bank stocks. Id. at 89. From this conclusion,
the court held that the beneficiaries had the right to reject the stock investments and to
demand that the trustees pay over the whole amount of their legacies and the interest
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War depression,35 the King decision limited trustees to investments in gov-
ernment bonds and mortgage-backed corporate debts. 6 This view quickly
spread throughout other states. 7
By the 1880s, many state legislatures responded to King by adopting
"legal list" regunes 3 8 These lists codified permussible trust investments and
generally limited trustees to choices among certain fixed income debt instru-
ments or bonds.39 Other investments, such as common stocks, became
improper unless the trust instrument gave the fiduciary discretion to make
such investments.' Over tine, changes in business and economc condi-
tions made the restrictive nature of these lists increasingly impractical.4
thereon. Id. at 92. Accordingly, the court ordered the trustees to pay the beneficiaries an
amount equal to a six percent annual return on the investments from the death of the
testator. Id. at 93-96; see also Taylor, supra note 26, at 55 (explaining that King classified
investments in shares of stock as imprudent and limited pernussible trust investments to
government bonds and mortgages).
35. See Austin Fleming, Prudent Investments: The Varying Standards of Prudence, 12
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 243, 244 (1977) (explaining that depression following Civil War
decreased economic stability experienced in America during first half of nineteenth century
and drastically devalued stocks).
36. See Taylor, supra note 26, at 55 (explaining that King decision found fiduciary
investments in stocks to be imprudent); cf Johnson, supra note 8, at 1176 (noting that 1889
New York statute prompted by King decision limited trust investments, unless otherwise
directed by settlor, to government bonds and first mortgage debt securities).
37 See Haskell, supra note 2, at 90 (advancing notion that New York's restrictive
position on trust investments soon became dominant among states). But see Taylor, supra
note 26, at 55 (explaining that Massachusetts declined to join movement among states to
adopt "legal lists").
38. See Stone, supra note 17, at 14-15 (concluding that passage of 1889 New York
statute governing permissible trust investments began legislative trend toward legal lists).
Black's defines a legal list as a "list of investments selected by various states in which
certain institutions and fiduciaries, such as insurance companies and banks, may invest."
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 895 (6th ed. 1990). "Legal lists are often restricted to high
quality securities meeting certain specifications." Id.
39. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 90 (noting that legal lists limited trustees to enumer-
ated categories of debt instruments); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 1176 (adding that
many states had legal lists that limited trustees to investments in debt instruments and bonds).
40. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 90 (commenting that by 1900, unless trust instru-
ments provided otherwise, only handful of states permitted trustees to invest in common
stocks); cf Stone, supra note 17, at 14 (emphasizing that testators in legal list jurisdictions
that wanted their trustees to invest in equities and other types of property needed to make
appropriate provisions in their wills or trust instruments).
41. See Fleming, supra note 35, at 244 (noting that legal lists failed to adapt to
changing economic and business conditions); see also Taylor, supra note 26, at 55 (illustrat-
ing failure of legal list regimes by explaining that investment portfolios regulated under
prudent man standards outperformed those under legal lists by two-to-one ratio).
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Consequently, by the 1930s most states had replaced the legal list with a
somewhat broader, more flexible standard commonly referred to as the
"prudent person rule."42 Although tis transition allowed for a wider vari-
ety of investment options, including stocks and other property, it still did
not fully embrace the adaptable approach put forward in Harvard College.4'
B. Shortcomings of the Prudent Person Standard
Preservation of trust corpus and production of income embody the core
goals of the prudent person rule. 4 However, given that the prudent person
rule, as enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, forbids any form
of speculation, trustees have difficulty meeting these goals when confronted
by rising inflation.4' Consequently, the strict view of prudence taken by the
prudent person rule inhibits truly effective trust management. 6
The prudent person rule falls short of the vision in Harvard College
in several respects. First, the analysis of each investment takes place in
isolation from the overall portfolio.47 Determinations of what is prudent
occur without regard to any net gain to the portfolio as a whole or to the
diversification of its assets.' This compartmentalization obstructs the
development of an integrated investment plan designed to achieve the high-
42. See Stone, supra note 17, at 14-15 (observing that, as United States began to pull
out of Depression, so too began movement away from restrictive legal lists m favor of
broader, more flexible standards).
43. See Fleming, supra note 35, at 245 (commenting that modem interpretation of
prudent person rule, particularly m Restatement (Second) of Trusts, points away from
flexible approach promoted by Harvard College and toward more rigid standards of
prudence found in English common law); cf. Haskell, supra note 2, at 90 (detailing limita-
tions of current statutory restrictions on investment, including those that now specifically
provide for investment in common stock and other property).
44. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 93 (explaining that prudent person rule principally
aimed to preserve trust capital and produce trust income).
45. See d. at 92 (referring to prudent person rule as misnomer because it does not
allow for speculative capital investments in keeping with modem notions of prudent
investment practices).
46. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 412 (claiming that arbitrary restrictions inhibit
exercise of sound judgment by skilled trustees); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 1177
(pointing out that stricter view of prudence deters trustees from doing best possible job for
beneficiaries).
47 See Haskell, supra note 2, at 93 (explaining that current investment rule looks at
investments m isolation when measuring prudence); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 1178
(noting that determinations of trustee's prudence come by analyzing each investment in
isolation).
48. See Fleming, supra note 35, at 248-49 (explaining that trustees face strict liability
for unprudent investments despite sufficient diversification or net gain by entire portfolio).
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est possible yield.49 Rather, courts tend to apply the prudent person rule
m a way that encourages an over-reliance on "safe" investments, such as
government bonds. These safer investments often have only modest
returns that barely exceed the rate of inflation.50
Second, the Restatement (Second) imposes no duty on the trustee to
protect the trust principal from inflation. 1 Considering that, historically,
inflation has outpaced the returns available from interest-bearing assets,52
49. See Samuel David Cheris, Making Responsible Investment Decisions in Light
of the Prudent Person Rule, 14 EST. PLAN. 338, 339-40 (1987) (criticizing effects of
compartmentalization as impediment to trustee's ability to achieve optimal economic results
because each investment is not part of overall investment plan designed for profit and
growth).
50. See id. at 340 (concluding that resulting tendency to invest in only those invest-
ments considered prudent or safe causes underdiversification m portfolio and thereby
increases overall risk because resulting low rates of return cannot keep pace with mfla-
tion).
51. See BEvis LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT
MAN RULE 14 (1986) (commenting that, while some courts respond positively to inflation-
conscious investment strategies, no court imposes duty to guard against depreciation in
purchasing power); see also Haskell, supra note 2, at 93 (noting that trustee has no duty to
guard against inflation); Johnson, supra note 8, at 1181 (explaining that prudent person rule
places trustee "under no duty to protect trust principal from inflation").
52. See Robert T. Willis, Jr., Prudent Investor Rule Gives Trustees New Guidelines,
19 EST. PLAN. 338, 339 (1992) (explaining that historical evidence supports conclusion
that inflation typically exceeds returns from interest-bearing investments). Willis observed:
The following historical data demonstrate the effect of inflation on the return
provided by interest bearing instruments over long periods of tune.
Annualized Total Returns
1926-1991 1950-1991
U.S. Treasury Bills 3.7% 5.3%
U.S. Government Bonds 5.1% 6.1%




The above table shows that average annual rates of return from U.S. Treasury
bills and U.S. Government bonds (average five-year maturities) for two time
periods, as well as the average annual inflation rates. The undeniable historical
facts are that the investment returns of interest bearing instruments have been
largely offset by inflation. The last two lines of the above table show that
inflation erased an average of 75% of the total returns provided by bonds and T-
bills during the two periods. The data for CDs would be very similar to the data
for Treasury bills. The result is actually worse when taxes are considered, as
shown below:
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this oversight jeopardizes virtually every portfolio.' Naturally, if the rate
of inflation consistently exceeds a portfolio's rate of return, then over time
it will deplete the trust principal.'M
Third, the prudent person rule requires active asset management by the
trustee.55 This duty exists despite the fact that active management tech-
niques rarely outperform comparable passive investment strategies, such as
portfolios composed of stock index funds. 6 In this regard, the prudent per-
son rule wholly contradicts current economic theory on asset management. 57
Average historical return for bonds (1950-1991) 6.10%
Minus inflation (1950-1991) (4.30)
Minus income tax at 25% (1.53)
Net return to trust 0.27%
The income tax is calculated on the pre-inflation (nominal) return (which for bonds
is 90% interest income). The above example indicates that both the remainder-
man's principal and the income beneficiary's income have eroded in purchasing
power. If principal does not grow to offset inflation, income likewise cannot
grow. The above example results in essentially no (only 0.27%) principal growth.
Id. at 339-40.
53. See Cheris, supra note 49, at 339 ("Loss of purchasing power through inflation
is a serious threat to every investment portfolio.").
54. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1181 ("When inflation exceeds the rate of return on
the trust investments erosion of the principal is bound to occur.").
55. See Chens, supra note 49, at 340 (citing requirement of active portfolio manage-
ment as major criticism of prudent person rule).
56. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 426 (asserting that current assessments of market
efficiency clearly support adoption of passive investment strategies including use of index
funds); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 1182 (explaining that costs associated with active
portfolio management practices generally exceed benefits such that active portfolios rarely
outperform passive portfolios); John H. Langbem & Richard A. Posner, The Revolution in
Trust Investment Law, 62 A.B.A. J. 887" 887 (1976) (confirming nearly 20 years ago that
actively managed institutional funds consistently underperforin broad market averages, like
Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index); Ted C. Fishman, The Bull Market in Fear, HARPER'S,
Oct. 1995, at 55, 61 (illustrating that "only one in three fund managers beats broad market
average for given year, and that very few do so year in and year out'). Fishman explained:
Even more telling is the fact that half the top ten funds in a given year number
among the worst funds within ten years. In fact, statisticians would tell us
that it would take 105 years of data to know if a manager who consistently beat
the market by 2 percent were really smarter than anyone else.
Id.
57 See Haskell, supra note 2, at 94 (asserting that prudent person rule is wholly
inconsistent with contemporary economic learning about portfolio management); cf. R.A.
BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 55 (1983)
(noting that, under concept of efficient markets, no portfolio manager can consistently
outperform market).
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Finally, the prudent person rule disfavors innovative investments. s8
For example, unless authorized by the governing instrument, a trustee may
not invest in "speculative" assets, such as futures contracts, foreign stocks,
or precious metals. 59  This constraint runs counter to the adaptability
promised in the development of the prudent person rule.'
C. An Introduction to the Prudent Investor Rule
The rigidity of the prudent person rule has not gone unrecogmzed."
The desire among academics and professionals alike has been to bring both
modem economic theory and common sense to contemporary trust manage-
ment.62 As a result, the Restatement (7urd), adopted by the American Law
Institute (ALl) in 1992, relies on modem portfolio theory to anchor the new
prudent investor rule.63
The ALI revised the Restatement (Second) standard for three reasons.
First, the ALI wanted to undo restrictive judicial precedent." Following
the decision in Harvard College, many cases gradually limited the flexibility
once thought available to trustees.' These subsequent cases essentially
58. See Robert A. Levy, The Prudent Investor Rule: Theories and Evidence, 1 GEO.
MASON L. REV 1, 3 (1994) (noting that prudent person rule prohibits purchasing securities
on margin, purchasing real property for resale, making venture capital commitments, and
questions safety of investments in precious metals, collectibles, deep discount bonds,
options, futures, repurchase agreements, and second mortgages).
59. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 93 (detailing how newer forms of investment, such as
options and futures, appear too speculative to receive acceptance under prudent person rule).
60. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1182 (commenting that rigid exclusion of new types
of investment runs counter to notion of adaptability thought to be original virtue of prudent
person rule).
61. See Stone, supra note 17, at 18 (revealing that, with high inflation during 1970s,
scholars and legislative bodies gradually began to realize inadequacy of prudent person
standard).
62. q. &d. (noting that passage of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) reflects recognition of need for increased reliance on sound economic theory and
common sense m trust management).
63. See Willis, supra note 52, at 338 (distinguishing Restatement (Third) from its
predecessor by highlighting Restatement (1lurd)'s focus on educating courts and practitioners
about modem portfolio theory and investment practices).
64. See id. at 338-39 (identifying desire to reverse trend m judicial decisions favoring
inflexible guidelines for trustees as major reason for move to prudent investor rule); see also
supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text (discussing development of case law following
Harvard College decision).
65. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 410 (illustrating how prudent person rule tended to
lose much of its adaptability as generalizations regarding investment guidelines for trustees
developed).
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fossilized trust asset management practices in outdated prmciples.' In light
of an increasingly complex economy, this rigid approach to fiduciary
investment became imprudent in its own right.67
Second, the rules needed modernization to reflect current asset man-
agement techniques.6" Passage of the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974 (ERISA) prompted this modernization effort.69 In addition
to federalizing the common law of trusts,7" ERISA incorporates several key
features of modem portfolio theory Most importantly, ERISA considers
no investment imprudent per se and links investment selection to an overall
investment strategy, rather than to individual asset performance.7' The
66. See Willis, supra note 52, at 339 (characterizing intent of Restatement (7hrd) as
desire to release trustees from former doctrines that crystallized rules concerning permissible
investments).
67 See Stone, supra note 17, at 14-15 (citing how strictures on possible portfolio
investments prevent trustees from acting conscientiously or making optimal management
decisions).
68. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 412 (promoting idea that recent trends in state and
federal legislation encouraged push for modernization and clarification of prudent man rule);
see also Willis, supra note 52; at 339 (citing passage of ERISA and recent updating of state
statutes to include principles of modem portfolio theory as major reason to advocate for
revision of prudent person rule).
69. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. 11995)); see also
Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, The New Prudent Investor Rule and the Modern Port-
folio Theory: A New Direction for Fiduciaries, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 39, 45-46 (1996) (calling
ERISA's enactment "[i]nfluential development" because it advanced "prudent expert rule");
Johnson, supra note 8, at 1184 (identifying ERISA as first legislation to apply modem
portfolio theory to fiduciary investments); cf. Cheris, supra note 49, at 340 (explaining that
Congress adopted ERISA after hearing extensive testimony demonstrating that prudent
person rule was far too rigid for regulating managers of employee benefit funds). Cheris
observed: "Currently, the ERISA standards are the most liberal enunciation of the prudent
person rule." Id.
70. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989) (explain-
ing that ERISA codifies common law of trusts). The Supreme Court said that "ERISA's
legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions 'codif[y] and
mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiducianes certain principles developed in the evolution of the
common law of trusts.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649); cf Willis, supra note 52, at 339 (concluding
that legislative history of ERISA inextricably links law governing pensions to common law
of trusts).
71. See Aalberts & Poon, supra note 69, at 46 (noting that ERISA impliedly sanc-
tioned use of modem portfolio theory and "encouraged [consideration of] total return and
total portfolio performance in governing pension plans"); see also Johnson, supra note 8,
at 1185 (implying that government regulations regarding ERISA do not use relative riskiness
of specific investments to characterize whether investment is per se prudent or imprudent;
PRUDENT INVESTMENT STANDARDS
ERISA approach allows fiduciaries to structure pension portfolios m a way
that takes advantage of market fluctuation, rather than m a way that merely
avoids it.'
Last, and perhaps most inportant, modem portfolio theory' now
receives wide acceptance throughout both the academic and investment
communities.4 Whereas the prudent person rule required trustees to bypass
risky investments unless otherwise authorized by the trust, modem portfolio
theory, as embodied m the prudent investor rule, seeks to benefit from such
investments. 75 As a result, trustees may now utilize a wider array of mod-
rather, relationship of specific investment to overall investment strategy determines pru-
dence). ERISA regulations explain:
(b) Investment duties (1) With regard to an investment or investment course of
action taken by a fiduciary the requirements of section 404(a)(1)(B) are
satisfied if the fiduciary-
(i) Has given appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances that,
given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary knows or
should know are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of
action involved, including the role the investment or investment course of action
plays m that portion of the plan's investment portfolio and
(ii) Has acted accordingly
(2) For purposes of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, "appropriate consider-
ation" shall include, but is not necessarily limited to
(i) A determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or invest-
ment course of action is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio to
further the purposes of the plan, taking into consideration the risk of loss and the
opportunity for gain associated with the investment or investment course of
action
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b) (1996); Willis, supra note 52, at 339 (elaborating on fact that
ERISA endorses concept of total return and total portfolio performance rather than mere
income yield and performance of single asset).
72. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1186 (claiming that prudent investor approach allows
trustees to construct portfolios using securities that react differently to market events so that
upward turn in one part of portfolio offsets downward turn m another part).
73. See Joel C. Dobrns, The Probate World at the End of the Century: Is a New Prmnci-
pal and Income Act uz Your Future?, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 393, 424 (1993) (noting
progress in using academic investment research as legal basis of fiduciary standards). See
generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 81 (1952) (introducing concept
of portfolio theory for which Markowitz received 1990 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences).
74. See REsTATEmENT (HRD) OF TRUSTS, introduction (1992) (explaining that mod-
em portfolio theory encouraged revision of fiduciary investment standards); see also Willis,
supra note 52, at 338 (commenting that drive toward prudent investor rule comes from empir-
ical research in investment management generally referred to as modem portfolio theory).
75. Cy. Johnson, supra note 8, at 1183 (clarifying that prudent investor rule empowers
trustees to embrace investment strategies that contain more risk than allowed under prudent
person rule).
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em investments and, consequently, can better respond to the -ever-changing
market conditions that they face.76 To aid the reader m understanding the
full impact of modem portfolio theory on contemporary trust management,
a discussion of the theory's basic features follows in Part H.
IlL An Overview of Modern Portfolio Theory
Acceptance of modem portfolio theory came slowly I Given that, in
part, the theory combines speculative and "safe" investments in an effort to
generate consistent portfolio gains, it can appear counterintuitive when
compared with previous standards of prudence.7" Nevertheless, decades of
empirical research now support modem portfolio theory and establish it
firmly in the mainstream.79
Current economc thinking broadly defines risk as the potential for an
investment to underperform its expected rate of return.' The focus of this
76. See id. at 1184 (explaining how modem portfolio theory provides trustees with
greater leeway to determine what investments trusts should hold, thereby allowing for
strategies that preserve capital funds while increasing returns and trust growth during
economic downturns).
77 See Willis, supra note 52, at 338 (showing slow acceptance of modem portfolio
theory). Willis observed:
Modem portfolio theory is a body of knowledge concerning investment analysis
and portfolio management that is creditable and thoroughly documented. Empiri-
cal research has been conducted by leading universities and the results debated
in scholarly journals. Some of the cornerstones of portfolio management date
back to the 1930s. The 1990 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded
for research in investment analysis and portfolio management. The
foundation for [the] award was research done m the 1950s and 1960s. It has
taken 50 years for legal scholars to acknowledge that this body of knowledge is
substantive, but that slow course of recognition was probably wise.
Id., see also Fishman, supra note 56, at 61 (noting that although developed in 1950s, Harry
Markowitz's "portfolio theory" did not receive careful consideration until 1976).
78. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 103 (finding justification for some measure of skepti-
cism with respect to modern portfolio theory because of its counterintuitive logic).
79 See Dobns, supra note 73, at 424 (concluding that, while trust law incorporates
academic research at glacial pace, research on investments from 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
is now gaining acceptance in legal circles); cf. Richard M. Todd, The Prudent Investor"
New Trust Management Rules, 22 CoLo. LAW. 281, 281 (1993) (commenting that Restate-
ment (Third) incorporates investment strategies of modern portfolio theory derived from
work of 1990 Nobel laureates Harry Markowitz and William Sharpe).
80. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 423 (explaining that projected returns from invest-
ment involve assessments not only of average anticipated investment returns but also of risk
that follows from "variance," or departure from that average); see also Haskell, supra note
2, at 100 (noting that risk reflects possibility that investments will perform below expected
returns).
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thinking is the relationship between the risk of an individual investment and
the entire investment portfolio."1 Modem portfolio theory recogmzes that
managing an asset's potential for underperformance can reward prudent in-
vestors. By dividing risk into its various components, the theory seeks to
aid an investor in understanding how to balance the opportunity for gain
against the degree of risk undertaken.s
Essentially, two types of risk threaten most investments. 4 The first
type of risk rises and falls in direct response, to general economic conditions
that affect the entire market.' Modem portfolio theory describes this type
of risk as "systematic" or "market" risk.' Because market risk mirrors the
fluctuations in the overall market, such risk is unavoidable. Nevertheless,
because a rising market compensates an investor in the form of higher
returns, incurring greater market risk is not inherently detrimental to an
investment strategy 87
81. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 100 (identifying importance of interrelationship
between individual investments and overall portfolio to modem economic theory); cf. Todd,
suzpra note 79, at 281 (noting that diversification requires spreading trust assets among
several classes of assets so that portfolio "includes assets that perform differently m various
economic climates").
82. Cf. Wade, supra note 32, at 714 (suggesting that there are market risks for which
market pricing offers rewards that prudent investors should take into account).
83. See Levy, supra note 58, at 7 (asserting that modem portfolio theory offers an
instructive framework for separating risk into market and nonmarket components); cf. Wade,
supra note 32, at 714 (commenting that trustees must consider degree of compensated risk
when analyzing investment objectives and designing portfolio to ensure balance between
opportunities for gain and degree of risk).
84. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 100-01 (stating that investments experience two basic
forms of risk).
85. See id. (explaining that market risk represents response by all securities to changes
in general economic conditions).
86. See id. (referring to risk experienced in response to changes in general economic
conditions as "systematic" or "market" risk).
87 See id. (noting that marketplace compensates buyers for systematic risks). Haskell
observed:
A fundamental principle of contemporary economic thinking is that the
marketplace compensates the buyer for systematic risk but does not compensate
the buyer for specific risk. Systematic risk is unavoidable; almost all stock
covary positively, albeit in different degrees, in relation to that risk. Expected
return is the riskless rate (short-term U.S. government debt) plus a rate deter-
mined in accordance with the degree of systematic risk.
Id., see also Levy, supra note 58, at 7 (emphasizing that market risks are not inherently bad
because investors receive compensation for such risks in form of higher returns).
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Modem portfolio theory describes the second form of nsk as "specific"
or "residual" risk.88 This type of risk represents those market forces that
negatively affect a specific investment or industry 89 Specific risk also
measures how the variability m the rate of return for an individual invest-
ment impacts the whole portfolio.' ° However, given that specific risk does
not precisely imitate market fluctuations, increases m the market do not
necessarily compensate an investor with higher returns when he assumes the
additional specific risk because of a particular asset.91 Nevertheless,
investors can take steps to avoid specific risk.' Diversification effectively
88. C. Levy, supra note 58, at 7 (labeling diversifiable risks as "specific" or "resid-
ual" risks).
89. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 101 (defining specific risk). Haskell observed:
The other form of risk is that which peculiarly affects a particular investment
or industry, as climate affects an agriculturally related investment, as Japanese
imports affect the American auto companies, and as the federal budget affects the
aerospace industry This risk is referred to as "specific," "unsystematic" or
"residual" risk. A risk that affects one stock negatively may affect another stock
positively, in which case the stocks are said to "covary negatively" with respect
to that risk; if they are affected in the same way by the same risk, they "covary
positively" with respect to that risk.
Id., cf Wade, supra note 32, at 714 (noting that every security possesses certain risks
unrelated to overall market conditions).
90. See Langbem & Posner, supra note 56, at 889 (illustrating counterbalancing effect
of diversification). Professors Langbem and Posner illustrated:
The 1973 Arab oil embargo damaged the fortunes of all automobile makers,
motel chains, and makers of recreational vehicles but benefited domestic oil
producers, the coal industry, and oil exploration service companies. Owning
shares in the last three groups of stocks would have enabled an investor to offset,
in part anyway, the losses he would have incurred on his holdings in the first
three groups.
Id., see also Levy, supra note 58, at 7 (explaining that specific risks represent variability
m rate of return that mitigates with proper portfolio diversification).
91. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 424 (noting failure of market to compensate for
specific risk); see also Haskell, supra note 2, at 101 (concluding that market does not
compensate investor for specific risk); Langbein & Posner, supra note 56, at 889 (extolling
virtues of diversification). Langbem and Posner added: "Although an investment policy that
achieves optimal diversification cannot eliminate nondiversifiable risk, it can eliminate the
uncompensated diversifiable risk, which represents a deadweight loss for the investor who
dislikes risk when it does not produce a higher return." Id., Levy, supra note 58, at 7
(explaining that higher market returns do not automatically compensate investors for
diversifiable risks).
92. Cf. Haskell, supra note 2, at 101 (suggesting that investors can avoid specific
risk). Haskell explained:
The marketplace does not compensate the buyer for specific (unsystematic)
risk. This is because the investor can balance the specific risk to one stock with
350
PRUDENT INVESTMENT STANDARDS
ties portfolio returns to general market conditions and thereby dilutes the
volatility associated with any one investment.' Therefore, by maintaining
a broad portfolio, one can better hold specific risk to a relatively low
level. 4
In addition to comparing risks, modem portfolio theory also suggests
that the investment markets are reasonably efficient.' This means that, at
any given time, the price of an investment reflects virtually all information
available for that investment.' More importantly, however, a reasonably
efficient market means that the price of an investment closely corresponds
to its degree of specific risk.' As a result, attempts to identify undervalued
investments in order to earn above average returns are rarely successful
because the market correctly prices every investment.9" The fact that the
the purchase of another stock that is affected positively by the same factor
which adversely affects the first stock. In other words, through diversification
specific risk can be virtually eliminated. If the investor can avoid the effect of
specific risk, there is no reason for the marketplace to compensate him for
the risk.
Id.
93. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 423 (observing that reductions m portfolio volatility
come from increasing number of assets held and by considering reactions those assets have
to various economic events); cf Haskell, supra note 2, at 102 (concluding that investors
with portfolios that contain negatively covarymg stocks experience expected returns that
adequately reflect systematic risks for each asset and thereby cause substantially all specific
risks to cancel out).
94. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 102 (using notion that contemporary economic theory
supports position that investors should maintain broad portfolios to reduce specific risk to
low levels).
95. See rd. at 103 (stating that most economic theorists view pricing of publicly traded
stocks as reasonably efficient).
96. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 425 (noting that economic research shows that major
capital markets tend to be highly efficient because market prices for securities generally
reflect all available information); see also Wade, supra note 32, at 714 (explaining that
efficient market theory postulates that, in markets in which market analysts know all basic
information about investments, market forces - through purchases and sales - assign
realistic values to those securities); cf Langbein & Posner, supra note 56, at 888 (describing
price of security as present value of its future earnings).
97 C. Halbach, supra note 8, at 423 (explaining that lower market prices for risky
securities express prospects for extra rewards to those investors who accept more volatile
returns); Haskell, supra note 2, at 103 (suggesting that, if stock prices reflect virtually all
available information, pricing of publicly traded stocks is reasonably efficient).
98. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 103 (contending that, if one accepts efficient market
theory, attempts to outperform market by selecting undervalued stocks are futile because no
such stocks exist); see also Langbem & Posner, supra note 56, at 888 (presuming that
current trading price correctly values every stock).
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majority of professional investment managers consistently fail to match the
performance of the market supports this view99
The ultimate goal of modem portfolio theory is to balance portfolio
risks and returns through diversification of the assets held." Relying on
efficient market principles, the theory concludes that, by using a wide range
of investments to build a portfolio that more closely resembles the overall
market, higher returns are possible."10 A diversified portfolio is prudent
because, by incurring mostly market risk, it mmnmzes the specific risk
associated with any one investment."° Using a broad spectrum of invest-
ments, including those once regarded as speculative, an investor can im-
prove the portfolio's expected rate of return without inherently increasing
its exposure to uncompensated risks." Thus, under modem portfolio
theory, the use of more volatile investments becomes prudent.1 4 Obvi-
ously, modem portfolio theory stands in sharp contrast to the notions of
safe investment followed under the prudent person standard. To aid the
reader in understanding how trust doctrine expects to benefit from this
theory, a discussion of the central features of the Restatement (Thtrd)
follows in Part IV
99. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 425 (noting that empirical research supporting
efficient market theory reveals that, m such markets, skilled professionals can rarely identify
underpriced securities or predict market forces affecting future return on investments); see
also Wade, supra note 32, at 714 (pointing to studies indicating that, even when discounting
for management fees, substantial majority of professional investment managers fail to match
market performance).
100. C. Halbach, supra note 8, at 433 (asserting that goal of diminishing uncompen-
sated risk through diversification should be pervasive consideration in prudent investment
management despite presence of specialized investment objectives).
101. See Ad. at 433-34 (identifying increases in degree of market risk as primary means
for increasing diversified portfolio's expected return); see also Haskell, supra note 2, at 103
(observing that, within efficient market, increased returns only occur through increased risks).
102. Cf. Haskell, supra note 2, at 103 (confirming that, when pricing is reasonably
efficient, passive strategy of investing broadly in market is both prudent and conservative
investment policy). But see d. (commenting that passive investment by trustees would be
questionable under prudent person rule because portfolio would include "speculative" stocks
unsuitable for trustee investment).
103. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 424 (concluding that diversified portfolios benefit
from reductions in firm-specific or diversifiable elements of risk with no impairment of
average expected returns); see also Haskell, supra note 2, at 102 (advocating maintenance
of broad portfolios to reduce specific risk to msignificance and to maximize benefits of sys-
tematic risk).
104. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 435 (concluding that trustees can prudently employ
risky assets in manner reasonably designed to reduce overall risk or to achieve higher returns
in appropriate circumstances without disproportionate increases in overall risk or expense).
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IV Advancements Made Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
Section 227 of the Restatement (Third), commonly referred to as the
"prudent investor rule,"" integrates the investment functions associated
with fiduciary admmstration in a unique way This integration combines
contemporary portfolio management techniques with established trust doc-
trine and, in the process, works to make the limits of prudent investment
less restrictive.1" Likewise, this combination clarifies the traditional duties
that a trustee must continue to perform m dealing with the complex modem
economy 107 The following discussion examines how the Restatement
(Third) redefines several fundamental fiduciary duties.
A. The Duty to Balance Risks Against Total Returns
Whereas the Restatement (Second) condemned trustees for speculative
investment practices, the prudent investor rule acknowledges that excessive
conservatism can prove equally harmful to trust beneficiaries."I This latter
viewpoint rests on the notion that the degree of market risk assumed and
higher portfolio returns share a direct relationship.07 As such, the prudent
105. See generally RESTATEMENT (TI-RD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992) (stating "General
Standard of Prudent Investment").
106. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 435 (lauding Restatement (lurd) and its advocacy of
relatively flexible principles of prudent investing as guide for trustees, trust counsel, and
courts).
107 Cf id. (identifymg considerations that trustees should make when analyzing invest-
ment decisions). Professor Halbach noted:
[A] trustee should analyze any investment or action by considering the contribu-
tions it can be expected to make to the trust's diversification needs, to fulfilling
the trustee's duty of impartiality, and to achieving a desired overall level of risk
and expected return for the trust estate, or perhaps otherwise m terms of a suit-
able portfolio and strategy for the trust in question.
Id.
108. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. e (1959) (noting that
speculation results in improper trust investment) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 227 cmt. e (1992) (explaining that speculation can assist trustees in complying with
requirement of caution); see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 437 (suggesting that excessive
conservatism, like excessive risk taking, may harm trust beneficiaries); Willis, supra note
52, at 341 (re-emphasizing that undue conservatism can undermine beneficial trust interests);
cf GIW Indus. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 733 (1 lth Cir.
1990) (finding prominent investment manager liable for investing almost all of pension
plan's assets in U.S. Treasury bonds).
109. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 436 (identifying direct relationship between market
risk and portfolio returns); cf Willis, supra note 52, at 341 (explaining that "only by
accepting a reasonable and appropriate amount of market risk can any portfolio grow at a
rate meaningfully greater than inflation").
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 335 (1997)
investor rule demands that the trustee make reasonable decisions regarding
the amount of risk that is appropriate to the objectives of the portfolio."'
This duty requires balancing the opportunities for gain that come from
using more speculative investments against the trust's capacity to withstand
the losses that will occur occasionallybecause of those investments."I Un-
fortunately, the prudent investor rule fails to identify where the appropriate
balance lies."' Instead, the Restatement (Third) explains that trustees
should consider the overall risk tolerance of a particular trust in relation to
its distribution requirements, specific terms, and general purposes.1
Ultimately, the degree of conservatism required for a particular trust is a
matter for the trustee's reasonable interpretation and judgment. 
114
Despite the lack of specific guidance offered by the Restatement
(Third) concerning the proper mix between risk and returns, the prudent
investor rule does provide trustees with two important guidelines for
determining that mix. First, no investment or investment strategy is Inher-
ently impermissible. "I This view differs significantly from previous trust
110. See RESTATEmENT (THiRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. b (1992) (commenting that
trustee's duties apply not only m making investment decisions but also in monitoring and
reviewing investments and that trustee should perform duties m manner that is reason-
able and appropriate to particular investments, courses of action, and strategies involved);
see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 436 (noting that reasonable decisions about acceptable
degree of market risk are integral part of decisions regarding trustee's ongoing investment
strategy).
11I. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 437 (insisting that trustees balance trust requirements
and potential gains against trust's capacity to absorb hazards created by adverse investment
outcomes).
112. See Willis, supra note 52, at 341 (recognizing that Restatement (Third) does not
state objective or general legal standard for degree of risk that is or is not prudent).
113. See REsrATEmEN (THIRD)OF TRuSTS § 227(a) (1992) (describing duty to balance
portfolio risks and returns). The Restatement (Third) states:
This standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution, and
is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of the trust
portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should mcorpo-
rate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.
Id., see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 436 (recommending that trustee's judgment reflect
assessment of particular trust's distribution requirements and risk tolerance together with
consideration of its pertinent terms and specific circumstances).
114. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 437 (concluding that, although general requirement
of conservatism in investment continues to flow from duty to use caution, ultimately trustee
must make reasonable interpretations and judgments about degree of conservatism required
and overall degree of risk permitted for particular trust).
115. See Willis, supra note 52, at 341 (noting that prudent investor rule has one clear
message - that no investment or course of action is inherently prudent or imprudent).
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doctrine, which categorically excluded certain investments as imprudent per
se. 116 Consequently, under the prudent investor rule, trustees are free to
utilize nearly any type of investment in creating a desirable balance between
risk and return for a given trust." 7
Second, the prudent investor rule defines what constitutes a reasonable
return using the concept of "total return."'18  Total return is the sum of
portfolio income plus capital appreciation or depreciation.1 9 Whereas trust
doctrine formerly characterized return as income yield alone, the prudent
investor rule considers increases in market value as part of the trust's return
as well.' This significant change gives trustees greater flexibility in
assessing tradeoffs between risk and reward by providing a much broader
view of what constitutes return and, consequently, what justifies increased
risks for the portfolio.''
B. The Duty to Diversify
Risk always accompanies one's entrance into the marketplace.' " By
offering a response to this problem, sound diversification becomes funda-
mental to the effective management of trust assets." To this end, the
116. See id. (concluding that Restatement (Third) position represents departure from
previous trust doctrine that considered certain investments necessarily imprudent).
117 C. Stone, supra note 17, at 12 (observing that Harvard College decision recog-
nized that capital of trust is always at risk and that more flexible standard of trustee action,
embracing all forms of investment, could exist within bounds of good judgment and care).
118. See Willis, supra note 52, at 341 (noting that, because Restatement (Third)
explicitly adopts investment industry's standard definition of "total return," duties of skill
and prudence generally require trustees to secure reasonable returns).
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. e (1992) (defining reasonable
return as "total return, including capital appreciation and gain as well as trust accounting
income"); see also Willis, supra note 52, at 341 (defining total return as "income plus
capital appreciation or depreciation").
120. See Willis, supra note 52, at 341 (noting that prior trust doctrine emphasized
income yield when considering return).
121. Cf. id. (explaining that total return concept allows trustees to seek economic
benefits for beneficiaries without artificially limiting those economic benefits with classifica-
tions such as income or appreciation).
122. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 436 (noting that risk, while not inherently bad, is
unavoidable in trust investing); see also Willis, supra note 52, at 341 (using illustration of
market volatility associated with U.S. Treasury securities and CDs to assert that no invest-
ment is risk free).
123. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 437 (re-emphasizmg that "[slound diversification is
fundamental to management of uncompensated risk"); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 227 cmt. g (1992) (commenting that asset allocation decisions are fundamental aspect of
investment strategies and serve as starting point for diversification plans). But cf. GIW
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prudent investor rule places great importance on the duty to diversify 124
This duty also is found in the Restatement (Second).2 5 However, the
Restatement (Third) modifies this duty by allowing greater managerial dis-
cretion. Whereas the Restatement (Second) mandated diversification with-
out exception, the prudent. investor rule relaxes this duty in the rare in-
stances when the trust instrument, applicable statutes, or general economic
conditions make it wiser to maintain a less diversified portfolio. 2
This change recognizes that the economy does not affect the value of
all investments in the same way 127 To strike an efficient counterbalance
within the portfolio, a trustee must consider not only the variety of assets
held, but also the manner in which each asset's response to economic
Indus. v Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 733 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(finding prominent investment manager liable for investing nearly all of pension plan's assets
in U.S. Treasury bonds); Estate of Knipp, 414 A.2d 1007, 1009 (Pa. 1980) (finding that
trustee acted within accepted standards of care, skill, and judgment required of fiduciary and
that there was no duty to diversify portfolio).
124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b). (1992) (defining duty to diver-
sify). The Restatement (Third) states that "[i]n making and implementing investment
decisions, the trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under
the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so." Id., see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 438-
39 (describing adverse tax considerations, inability to realize full value from sale of prop-
erty, or unique character of asset as special circumstances when diversification is unpru-
dent).
125. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228 (1959) (requiring portfolio
diversification in order to distribute risk of loss), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 227 cint. g (1992) (discussing requirement of portfolio diversification); see also Halbach,
supra note 8, at 438 (explaining that, given central role of diversification in modem
concepts of prudence, Restatement (Third) incorporates duty to diversify into basic text and
commentary of prudent investor rule).
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. g (1992) (commenting that duty
to diversify does not prohibit favoring one class of investment). The Restatement (Third)
explains:
In fact, given the variety of defensible investment strategies and the wide vana-
tions in trust purposes, terms, obligations, and other circumstances, diversifica-
tion concerns do not necessarily preclude an asset allocation plan that emphasizes
a single category of investments as long as the requirements of both caution and
impartiality are accommodated in a manner suitable to the objectives of the
particular trust.
Id., see also Levy, supra note 58, at 6 (highlighting fact that Section 228 of Restatement
(17urd) exculpates trustee if trustee refrains from diversifying in compliance with terms of
trust or any applicable statute).
127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. g (1992) (noting that events
affecting economy do not affect value of all investments in same way); see also Halbach,




changes impacts the other holdings.'I As noted above, proper diversifica-
tion enables a trustee to use varied investments to manage uncompensated
risks more effectively and, thus, to increase returns.1 29
Fortunately, the heightened importance that the prudent investor rule
places on diversification corresponds to other developments that make this
objective easier to achieve. 11 As pooled investment vehicles, such as
mutual funds, proliferate and grow to include nearly every type of invest-
ment, thorough diversification becomes eminently practical for virtually all
trustees."' The result - a more prudent form of risk taking - enables
128. See RSTATEMENT (THRD) oF TRusTs § 227 cmt. g (1992) (commenting that
effective diversification depends not only on number of assets held in trust portfolio, but also
on whether assets' responses to economic events tend to cancel or neutralize one another);
see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 440 (restating understanding of effective diversification
put forward by Restatement (Third)).
129. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 440 (agreeing that otherwise volatile investment can
make major contribution to risk management if shifts in returns tend not to correlate with
movements of other investments m portfolio); see also Levy, supra note 58, at 13-14
(providing example of advantage offered by mix of investment grades). Professor Levy
observed:
The correlation coefficient between long-term government bonds and small
capitalization stocks over the 10-year period ended June 30, 1992 was 0.155; the
respective annualized standard deviations for the two assets were 11.8% and
21.4% (i.e., small cap stocks were nearly twice as volatile as long-term govern-
ment bonds). Since the correlation is fairly low, combining the assets should
stabilize return. In fact, the standard deviation of a portfolio allocated 2/3 to
long-term government bonds and 1/3 to small cap stocks would be 11.2% -
lower than the 11.8% for the long-term government bonds standing alone. Thus,
by adding a relatively high-risk asset like small cap stocks to a low-risk asset like
long-term government bonds, one can produce a portfolio with a lower standard
deviation than either of the individual assets. The combined portfolio is more
efficient than a 100% investment in long-term governments; the expected rate of
return would be enhanced by adding equities, and the risk as measured by
standard deviation is lower.
Id.
130. C. Halbach, supra note 8, at 440 (elaborating on possibility of thorough diversifi-
cation for virtually all trustees due to wide offering of pooled investments).
131. See RESTATEMENT (HinD) OFTRUSTS § 227 cmt. g (1992) (noting practicality of
diversification for most trustees). The Restatement (Third) states:
Broadened diversification may lead to additional transaction costs, at least
initially, but the constraining effect of these costs can generally be dealt with
quite effectively through pooled investing. Hence, thorough diversification is
practical for nearly all trustees. The ultimate goal of diversification would be to
achieve a portfolio with only the rewarded or "market" element of risk.
Id. But see Langbem & Posner, supra note 56, at 889 (questioning ease of diversification).
The point has been made that if one carefully selects about thirty stocks, the port-
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trustees to use speculation to benefit the portfolio without completely
sacrificing the caution that tradition demands.'
C. The Duty of Impartiality
The duty to treat trust beneficiaries impartially' requires a trustee to
balance the competing needs of life tenants and remamdermen.134 However,
by eroding the trust principal, the effects of inflation frustrate a trustee's
ability to treat income beneficiaries and future interests equally 135 The
folio will be as much as 90 to 95 per cent correlated with the movements of the
market. But a 90 or even 95 per cent correlation by no means eliminates all or
even 90 to 95 per cent of the diversifiable risk. If the market as a whole
rose in value (including dividends and appreciation) by 10 per cent m one year,
there would be a good chance that the thirty-stock portfolio would rise by as little
as 5.5 per cent. It is only when the portfolio reaches about two hundred stocks
that the range within which its return can be expected to fall is reduced to 1 per
cent on either side of the market's expected return.
Id. (emphasis added).
132. Cy. RESrATEMENT (1-mRD) OFTRUSTS § 227 cmt. g (1992) (suggesting that diver-
sification allows trustees to balance conservatism against needs of portfolio). The Restate-
ment (Third) explains that "[tihe rationale of the trust law's requirement of diversification
is more than conservatism or a duty of caution, which admonishes trustees not to take
excessive risks - that is, not to take risks higher than suitable to a trust's purposes, return
requirements, and other circumstances." Id., see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 441
(confirming that forbidding or placing arbitrary limits on risk taking is unrealistic and that
fiduciary prudence ordinarily requires reasonable efforts to reduce uncompensated elements
of risk through diversification).
133. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. y (1959) (noting that
improper trust investment includes assets that unduly favor one beneficiary over another),
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 227(c)(1) (1992) (adding duty of impartiality
to other fiduciary duties). The Restatement (Third) states that "[i]n addition, the trustee
must conform to fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty (§ 170) and impartiality (§ 183)."
Id. § 227(c)(1). The Restatement (Third) also states that "[w]hen there are two or more
beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them." Id. § 183.
134. See RESTATEMENT ('HIRD) OFTRusTs § 227 cint. c (1992) (commenting that duty
of impartiality requires trustee to balance competing interests of differently situated benefi-
ciares in fair and reasonable manner); see also Robert T. Willis, Jr., Steps to Protect the
Fiductaryfrom Liabilityfor Investment Decisions, 16 EST. PLAN. 228, 230 (1989) (describ-
ing divergent objectives of life tenants and remainder beneficiaries). Willis stated: "Life
tenants usually prefer high-income investments with little emphasis on growth while
remainder beneficiaries prefer low-income investments with the emphasis on growth in order
to maintain the purchasing power (i.e., inflation adjusted) of the remainder." Id.
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. c (1992) (noting that interests
of life income beneficiaries almost inherently compete with those of remainder beneficiaries,
especially m light of inflation risks; likewise, differing tax circumstances of various classes
of beneficiaries frequently create competing investment preferences); see also Willis, supra
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prudent investor rule facilitates the duty of impartiality through a more
flexible standard and seeks to clarify the trustee's obligations to conflicting
interests in the trust. 
36
The prudent investor rule recognizes that income production is more
a function of the portfolio's overall productivity than of the productivity of
each investment. 137  Likewise, the Restatement (Third) recognizes that,
because the relationsups among trust beneficiaries vary, the proper amount
of income production also will vary considerably for each trust.
13 1 There-
fore, the prudent investor rule encourages trustees to balance the market
forces that affect each of those beneficial relationships.
139
To this end, the prudent investor rule enlarges the concept of trust
preservation to include the protection of trust capital and its purchasing
power from the threat of Inflation.11 To illustrate this point, the Restate-
ment (7hrd) explains how an investment strategy that seeks maximum
income yield may mmmuze growth of the trust corpus. 4 ' Although such
note 52, at 340 (concluding that erosion from inflation affects trustee's duty to treat income
and remainder beneficiaries impartially). Willis illustrated:
A trust requires payment of income to Roberta for life, with remainder to Rich-
ard on Roberta's death. The trustee invests the trust funds primarily m CDs and
Government bonds. In the absence of sound reasons for this investment strategy,
it appears to favor Roberta with high income yield at the expense of the value of
Richard's future principal due to erosion of the trust principal from inflation.
Id.
136. See RESTATEMENT (THMD) OF TRusTs § 227 cmt. c (1992) (commenting that
conflicting fiduciary obligations result m necessarily flexible and somewhat indefinite duty
of impartiality); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained
Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV 52, 56 (1987) (concluding that only significant clash
between portfolio theory and trust doctrine arises in allocation of returns between life
beneficiaries and remaindermen); Halbach, supra note 8, at 441 (noting that prudent investor
rule includes flexible and more comprehensive duty of impartiality).
137 See Halbach, supra note 8, at 442 (commenting that Restatement (Third) evaluates
productivity of income m relation to productivity of trust portfolio as whole, rather than in
relation to productivity of each investment).
138. See td. (noting Restatement (hird)'s recognition that appropriate overall degree
of income productivity will vary considerably from trust to trust because of differences in
trust purposes and relationships among beneficianes).
139. See ut. (encouraging trustees to take reasonable and balanced account of potential
and differing impacts that factors such as taxation and inflation impose on beneficiaries).
140. See id. at 443 (viewing objective of "safety" or "preservation" of trust capital
within prudent investor rule to include protecting trust's purchasing power from risks of
inflation).
141. See RESTATEmENT CMIRD) OF TRusTs § 227 cmt. c, illus. 7 (1992) (demonstrating
how maximizing income yield may nmmize corpus growth). For example, the Restatement
(Third) illustrates:
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a strategy satisfies the income beneficiaries' interest, it leaves any remain-
dermen with diminished real purchasing power and, therefore, violates the
duty of impartiality by favoring one group's interest over another group's
interest. 142 In response, the prudent investor rule recogmzes the need for
investment strategies that ain to increase, and not merely to preserve, real
purchasing power.143
Obviously, any strategy that pursues higher returns necessarily involves
taking increased risks that may not succeed.'" Regardless of the degree of
care and skill used by the trustee, the prudent investor rule accepts the
potential for losses as a virtual certainty 145 Consequently, the Restatement
(Thtrd) excuses trustees from liability for periodic losses that occur in the
attempt to preserve portfolio purchasing power.' 4 This lemency suggests
a greater appreciation for the often opposing demands made by the duty of
T is trustee of a trust to pay income to A for life, remainder to B if then living
and if not then by right of representation to B's issue who are then living. T
invests the trust funds m investments of a type that, despite the broad range of
yields that might be appropriate to particular trusts, appear unduly to favor A's
interest in receiving a high income at the expense of the B family's interest in
having corpus protected against loss of purchasing power. This constitutes a
breach of T's duty of impartiality in the absence of satisfactory explanation.
Id., see also Willis, supra note 52, at 340 (noting that Restatement (Third) advises trustees
to understand that investment strategies which focus primarily on maxumizmg income yield
will minimize or ignore possibilities for growth).
142. See Willis, supra note 52, at 340 (admonishing trustees to recognize that maximiz-
ing income yield at expense of growth may force invasions of corpus to support income
beneficiaries and may suggest violation of impartiality); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 227 cmt. c (1992) (warning that trustees should recognize that, in inflationary
times, igh-yield and low-growth investment strategies, adhered to over long periods, pose
risks with respect to life beneficiary's future security and have effects comparable to regular
practice of invading principal).
143. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 443 (justifymg, under some circumstances,
investment strategies that seek to enhance and not merely preserve real value of trust
capital).
144. See RSTATEMENT (HID) oF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. e (1992) (accepting notion that
objective of preserving portfolio purchasing power carries with it some increases in risk);
see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 443 (recognizing that goal of higher returns carries some
increases in risk that will not always pay off, especially in short run).
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. e (1992) (recognizmg that, in
some periods, trustees cannot succeed in preserving portfolio purchasing power); see also
Halbach, supra note 8, at 443 (noting Restatement (7hurd)'s acceptance that, despite exercise
of due skill and care, trustees cannot always maintain portfolio purchasing power).
146. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 443 (explaining that, if trustee has used due care
and skill, liability does not attach when trustee fails to preserve purchasing power of port-
folio).
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impartiality 147 Overall, the prudent investor rule allows trustees more
flexibility m balancing the competing needs found within multiparty and
multigenerational trusts. Tlus flexibility also recognizes the idea that
prudent trust investing varies according to the nature, purposes, and cir-
cumstances of the respective trust.148
D The Authority to Delegate
The Restatement (Second) limited a trustee's delegation authority
to "minsterial"'149 functions only 150 In contrast, the Restatement (Third)
greatly expands a trustee's delegation authority,"' particularly with respect
to investment matters."m The prudent investor rule allows a trustee to
147 C. id. at 443-44 (praising Restatement (Third)'s elaborate discussion of investment
implications created by duty of impartiality as effort to increase, or at least to clarify, both
flexibility of that duty and concerns duty addresses).
148. C. id. at 443 (recommending that rules governing trust investment activities be
sensitive to (1) competition between needs of present and future interests m trust and (2) fact
that degrees of productivity requirements will differ significantly depending on nature,
purposes, and circumstances of different trusts).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959) (characterizing "ministerial"
functions as those functions that it is not reasonable to require trustee to perform); see also
John H. Langbem, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 Mo. L.
Rav 105, 108 (1994) (describing fiduciary's obligation to perform ministerial functions).
Professor Langbein illustrated:
When a piece of residential real estate is held in trust for family members, the
list of agents whom the trustee may employ can lengthen to include the panoply
of household providers - gardeners, plumbers, cleaning staff, house painters,
and so forth. The trustee does not have to take out the garbage or paint the
house in person.
Id.
150. See Willis, supra note 52, at 341-42 (explaining that prior trust doctrines and
treatises permitted delegation of administrative duties only).
151. See RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 171,227(c)(2) (1992). Section 227(c)(2)
of the Restatement (Third) requires trustees to "act with prudence in deciding whether and
how to delegate authority and in the selection and supervision of agents (§ 171)." Section
171 states:
A trustee has a duty personally to perform the responsibilities of the trusteeship
except as a prudent person might delegate those responsibilities to others. In
deciding whether, to whom and in what manner to delegate fiduciary authority
in the administration of a trust, and thereafter in supervising agents, the trustee
is under a duty to the beneficiaries to exercise fiduciary discretion and to act as
a prudent person would act in similar circumstances.
Id. § 171, see also Willis, supra note 52, at 342 (concluding that Restatement (Third)
completely eliminates former prohibition on delegation of discretionary authority previously
advanced in trust doctrine).
152. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 445 (mentioning that, as compared with its predeces-
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assign broad decision-makmg responsibilities for the trust to others's and,
in the case of nonprofessional fiduciaries, may impose a duty to delegate
to investment professionals." This revision seeks to widen efficient trust
management practices by allowing, and even sometimes requiring, trustees
to use outside expertise to identify available risk-reward tradeoffs and
opportunities for additional diversification. 55 Nevertheless, this increased
latitude to delegate does not relieve a trustee from personally defining, or
at least approving, the trust's investment strategies and objectives. 56
sors, Restatement (Third) takes nearly opposite view of trustee's duty with respect to delega-
tion in investment matters); cf. Langbem, supra note 149, at 106 (suggesting that, by
making it easier to externalize investment functions, prudent investor rule will encourage
persons who lack investment expertise, such as family members and lawyers, to serve as
trustees).
153. See RSrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. j (1992) (discussing duty with
respect to delegation). The Restatement (Third) states:
The trustee's authority to delegate is not confined to acts that might reason-
ably be described as "ministerial." Nor is delegation precluded because the
act in question calls for the exercise of considerable judgment or discretion.
The trustee's decisions with regard to delegation are themselves matters of fidu-
ciary judgment and responsibility falling within the sound discretion of the
trustee.
Id., see Willis, supra note 52, at 342 (explaining that trustees can now delegate broad
decision-makmg responsibilities under Restatement (Third)).
154. See Wade, supra note 32, at 715 (suggesting that, for nonprofessional fiduciaries,
Restatement (Third) may impose duty to obtain informed investment assistance); cf. Lang-
bern, supra note 149, at 110 (concluding that well-intentioned trustees will seek out and rely
upon outside advisors m performing investment function). See generally Richard Korman,
Tuane to Tust Your Trust Fund to a Pro?, Bus. WK., Dec. 5, 1994, at 114 (praising author-
ity to appoint professional trustee to handle investment duties).
155. Cf. Langbem, supra note 149, at 110 (explaining why it is more efficient to
delegate investment functions). Professor Langbem commented:
Today financial instruments have become the typical asset of the trust, and
these assets require active fiduciary administration. Managing a portfolio of
marketable securities is as demanding a specialty as stomach surgery or nuclear
engineering. There is no more reason to expect the ordinary individual serving
as a trustee to possess the requisite investment expertise than to expect ordinary
citizens to possess expertise in gastroenterology or atomic science.
Id., Wade, supra note 32, at 715 (stating that duty to delegate involves seeking professional
assistance to clarify objectives and analyze risk/reward tradeoffs with respect to compensated
risk).
156. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 445-46 (clarifying that, despite reliance on profes-
sional advice as needed, trustees should personally define or approve trust's investment
strategies and objectives). But cf Taylor, supra note 26, at 60 (arguing that delegation
authority has defensive component that protects trustee against allegation that trustee was
too unsophisticated or too busy to manage portfolio without assistance).
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Likewise, the prudent investor rule does not relax the trustee's duty to act
with care, skill, and caution when delegating authority "5
As a part of the duty to delegate, the prudent investor rule emphasizes
the trustee's obligation to invest in a cost-conscious manner. This emphasis
builds on traditional trust doctrine and requires trustees to avoid unwar-
ranted expenses when admmistermg trusts.' Under the prudent investor
rule, a trustee must consider such expenses m light of efficient market prin-
ciples. 19 Accordingly, the trustee should balance the transaction costs
associated with outside advice, investment fees and commissions, and
additional capital gains taxation against the prospect that these activities
will lead to increased returns."64 Although tlus view necessarily favors
passive investment strategies, the duty to be cost-conscious does not fore-
close more active approaches when appropriate."' In short, the prudent
investor rule continues to encourage reasonable attention to the costs of
administering the trust.
157 See Halbach, supra note 8, at 447 (warning that increased acceptance of delegation
by trustees generally does not alter trustee's duty to act with care, skill, and caution m
delegating investment authority); cf Langbem, supra note 149, at 110 (criticizing traditional
rule prohibiting delegation as disservice to trust beneficiaries because prohibition prevents
open discussion of standards and safeguards appropriate to delegation).
158. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 447 (noting that trustee traditionally has "duty to
avoid incurring unwarranted expenses" in administering trust).
159. See ut. (suggesting that cost-conscious administration should consider market
efficiency information and concepts, but should also recognize presence of "different degrees
of efficiency in different markets"); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. g
(1992) (explaining that significant diversification advantages are possible with small number
of well-selected securities representing different industries and having other qualitative
differences). But cf. Langbem & Posner, supra note 56, at 889 (suggesting effective
diversification requires investments in 200 or more securities).
160. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 447 (advising trustees to compare any additional
transaction costs, including capital gains taxation, resulting from particular management
strategy or course of action with realistically appraised prospects of increased returns from
transaction); see also Willis, supra note 52, at 342 (concluding that trustees should justify
costs of investment advisor, mutual fund sales charges and fees, and real estate management
fees in terms of expected return and necessity of services purchased).
161. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 447-48 (noting that, although commentary of prudent
investor rule encourages relatively passive investment and indexing techniques, it avoids
suggesting that active strategies are impermissible); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 227 cmt. e (1992) (explaining that prudent investor rule's emphasis on long-term investing
does not prevent use of active management strategies, including use of investments or
techniques heretofore characterized as risky or speculative). But cf. Langbem, supra note
149, at 110 (concluding that, because securities have become typical asset in modem trust,
active fiduciary administration is necessary).
363
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E. Expanding Liability for Trustees
The prudent investor rule makes it more difficult for the trustee who
neglects a fiduciary obligation to avoid liability 162 In a complete departure
from historical practices, 63 the prudent investor rule now measures a
trustee's liability by comparing the portfolio's total return, 164 whether posi-
tive or negative, with what the portfolio reasonably could expect to earn
under an "appropriate" investment program. 1 In addition, ttus standard
potentially increases the amount of a trustee's liability in an action for
breach of fiduciary duty
The adoption of this standard reflects, in part, the ready availability of
the investment performance data needed for accurate comparisons of total
return.'1 For example, in an action for breach of fiduciary duty, a court
could use a similar trust portfolio or a recogmzed securities index as a
benchmark when comparing a given portfolio's total return.167 More un-
portantly, the total returns approach maintains the traditional goal of dam-
age awards for breach - to place beneficiaries where proper trust manage-
ment would have placed them. 16  On balance, the total return concept
162. Cy. Halbach, supra note 8, at 459 (commenting that major objective of prudent
investor rule was to insure that trustees who ignored their fiduciary obligations by using
inadequate investment strategies could not avoid liability merely because investment program
escaped loss of dollar value during periods of significantly rising markets m which trusts
should have but did not fully benefit).
163. Cf. Halbach, supra note 8, at 458 (looking at prudent investor rule as dramatic
break with past doctrine in use of total returns, whether positive or negative, as new
measure of trustee liability for improper investment).
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. e (1992) (linking concept of
reasonable return with concept of total return - including capital appreciation and gain, as
well as trust accounting income); Willis, supra note 52, at 341 (defining total return as
"income plus capital appreciation or depreciation").
165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1992) (explaining that
recovery for improper investment by trustee ordinarily is difference between (1) value of
investment and its income at time of surcharge and (2) amount of funds expended in making
investment, increased or decreased by amount of total return that would have accrued to
trust if properly invested); see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 459 (noting that prudent
investor rule allows surcharges to reflect gains and losses reasonably expected from appro-
priate investment program).
166. Cy. Halbach, supra note 8, at 460 (crediting extension of total return approach to
damages to ready availability of fair and relevant performance data in today's financial
world).
167 See id. (identifying possible units of comparison available when applying total
return approach to damages).
168. See id. (asserting appropriateness of total return measure of damages in light of
objectives of traditional trust doctrine - to restore trust estate to position possible through
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represents a very practical approach to measuring the damages resulting
from fiduciary mismanagement. 169
In keeping with traditional trust doctrine, the prudent investor rule
limits a trustee's ability to offset losses caused by one asset in the portfolio
with profits from other assets.17 This limitation - called the "anti-netting"
rule - exists despite considerable criticism that it inhibits the use of mod-
ern portfolio theory by encouraging the exclusive use of low-risk invest-
ments to avoid losses entirely 171 However, because the Restatement
(Third)'s anti-netting provision triggers only after a breach has occurred,
such criticism arguably is without merit."7 To facilitate the use of the anti-
netting rule m assessing damages, the prudent investor rule more carefully
defines profit and loss."7
proper administration); cf RiiSrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 213 cmt. b (1992) (defining
loss from breach of trust as amount necessary to restore value of beneficial interest to value
possible through proper administration).
169. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 461 (listing recent state court decisions involving
underdiversification or inadequate impartiality in asset allocation to illustrate practicality of
total return measure of damages); cf In re Estate of Anderson, 196 Cal. Rptr. 782, 795 (Ct.
App. 1983) (finding appreciation damages appropriate when executor breached duty of
loyalty); In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 296 (N.Y 1977) (same); Baker Boyer
Nat'l Bank v. Garver, 719 P.2d 583, 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that damages for
trustee's failure to diversify include lost appreciation m equity securities that properly diver-
sified portfolio would produce).
170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1992) (outlining so-called "anti-
netting rule"). Section 213 states:
A trustee who is liable for a loss caused by a breach of trust may not reduce the
amount of liability by deducting the amount of a profit that accrued through
another and distinct breach of trust; but if the breaches of trust are not separate
and distinct, the trustee is accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only
with the net loss resulting therefrom.
Id.
171. See LONGsmET, supra note 51, at 60 (criticizing anti-netting rule for assessing
prudence of each investment separately and thereby barring fiduciaries from employing
modern techniques of risk management to detriment of beneficiaries). But see Halbach,
supra note 8, at 420 (debunking criticisms of anti-netting rule).
172. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 420 (emphasizing that anti-netting rule serves only
to measure damages; anti-netting rule does not measure prudence).
173. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 213 cmt. b (1992) (clarifying mean-
ing of "loss" and "profit" within Section 213). "Loss" is amount necessary to restore
trust to value it would achieve with proper administration. Id. "Profit" is amount by
which beneficial interests exceed value of trust otherwise possible with proper administra-
tion. Id.
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V The Practical Effects of the Prudent Investor Rule
A. A Current Perspective on Past Cases
Harvard College v Amory established that trustees could invest in a
wide range of securities." The Restatement (Third) advocates a return to
the lesson of Harvard College.75 However, because that lesson differs so
greatly from current fiduciary investment practices, 176 many judges and
trustees may lack the perspective necessary to appreciate fully the funda-
mental changes proposed by the prudent investor rule."7 The absence of
cases that explore the question of investment prudence under the Restate-
ment (Third) hampers any attempt to inform judges and trustees in this
regard. 7' Until such guidance arrives, a reconsideration of significant past
cases may address this problem. By understanding whether the outcomes
of earlier cases change in light of the Restatement (Third), judges and
trustees can make reasonable predictions about how courts will apply the
prudent investor rule. The following sections examine three cases for this
purpose.
1. Estate of Krupp
Estate of Krnpp79 provides an opportunity to study the duty to diver-
sify found under the prudent investor rule." In Knipp, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considered whether to surcharge a corporate fiduciary,
174. See Harvard College v Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 465 (1830) (finding that trustees
acted prudently when trustees invested in stocks of manufacturing and insurance companies).
175. See RESTATEmENT (TIRED) OF TRUSTS, introduction (1992) (expressing desire to
return to flexible approach announced in Harvard College).
176. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text (discussing failures of prudent
person standard).
177 C. Gordon, supra note 136, at 66 (criticizing modem courts). Professor Gordon
stated: "It is striking to see contemporary courts, citing the Restatement, the Treatise, or
authority derived from those two sources, haul professional trustees over the coals for
investment policies that few financial economists would find exceptionable." Id.
178. See id. at 75 (decrying lack of recently decided cases that address question of
contemporary investment prudence). Professor Gordon complained that "there are perhaps
[only] ten cases after 1965 giving serious consideration to the trustee's investment manage-
ment." Id. at 66 n.50; see also Langbem & Posner, supra note 56, at 890 (noting that most
case law interpreting trustee's duty of prudence dates from 1930s or earlier).
179. 414 A.2d 1007 (Pa. 1980).
180. Estate of Knipp, 414 A.2d 1007, 1007-10 (Pa. 1980) (considering fiduciary's
failure to diversify estate's stock holdings); cf John W Church & Edward L. Snitzer,
Diversification, Risk, and Modem Portfolio Theory, TR. & EST., Oct. 1985, at 32, 33 (using
Knipp to compare results of broad versus narrow diversification).
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Central Penn National Bank, for its failure to diversify the assets of an
estate. '8 At the decedent's death, the estate contained 4314 shares of Sears
Roebuck & Co. common stock valued at $4 70 ,0 00 .1z This investment
constituted 97% of the estate's stock portfolio and over 70% of its total
assets. 18 The bank sold four hundred shares during the first year of admm-
istration to cover costs.' 84
Over the next few years, the price of the stock declined precipitously;
however, the bank retained the stock in the hope that it would rebound."l
Under a provision m the will, the bank had absolute discretion to retain or
sell the stock.1" Despite dramatic losses, the state supreme court affirmed
the lower court's refusal to surcharge the bank."g In so doing, the court
stressed that a testamentary provision authorizing the retention of portfolio
assets did not excuse the bank from making prudent investment decisions. 18
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania court found that Sears Roebuck & Co. was
a sound investment' 89 and that the bank had no duty to diversify "
181. Kntpp, 414 A.2d at 1008 (finding that corporate executor exercised degree of care,





185. Id. Between November 1972 and February 1974, the price of the stock dropped
from $117 to $88 per share. Id. Unfortunately, it continued to decline thereafter. Id.
186. Id.
187 Id. at 1009.
188. See it. (qualifying authorization to retarn assets). The court stated: "On the other
hand, we are not prepared to say that authorization to retain assets gives an executor or
trustee an absolute and unbridled discretion to sit idly by while those assets depreciate m
value." Id. But see First Alabama Bank v Spragms, 515 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. 1987)
(holding trustee liable for breach of fiduciary duty when trustee failed to diversify trust
investments and to dispose of stock that composed more than 70% of trust estate); Ipsen,
supra note 4, at 462 (discussing Spragms). Ipsen noted: "The language of the trust provided
that the trustee could change investments from time to time as it thought necessary or
desirable, regardless of any lack of diversification, risk or non-productivity The hold-
ing of this case is difficult to rationalize on anything other than a result-oriented basis." Id.
189. See Krapp, 414 A.2d at 1008 (assessing prudence of Sears Roebuck & Co. invest-
ment). The court explained that "[tihe evidence establishes that Sears stock was, during the
period in question, reasonably believed to be a sound, national, broad-based stock worthy
of investment by a fiduciary " Id.
190. See id. at 1009 (concluding that duty to diversify did not exist). The court reasoned:
Although many financial authorities advocate diversity of investment as a desir-
able course for trust management, a judicial decision declaring non-diversification
to be presumptively imprudent would arbitrarily foreclose executors and trustees
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Clearly, Knipp stands in sharp contrast to the duty to diversify found
under the prudent investor rule.19' As noted above, modem portfolio theory
focuses, m part, on diversification and, therefore, suggests that underdiver-
sification is inprudent. l1 Consequently, under the prudent investor rule,
the Knipp court likely would reach an opposite result.
Two considerations support this view First, the prudent investor rule
requires diversification unless certain factors, such as adverse tax conse-
quences or the unique character of the asset, make diversification less desir-
able."9 Apparently, no special circumstances existed in Knipp Instead, the
evidence suggested that the corporate fiduciary retained the stock m the hope
that its declining price rmght recover." Modem portfolio theory assesses
each investment m relation to its effect on the entire portfolio, not in isola-
tion." Given that this deteriorating investment represented more than two-
thirds of the portfolio, it is difficult to justify the bank's retention of the
stock under the new standard, arguably making it liable for the surcharge.
Second, the prudent investor rule requires that a fiduciary determine if
the risk being undertaken is appropriate for the beneficiaries.'9 Using
from opportunities to retain beneficial holdings. The preferable approach,
therefore, is to determine on a case by case basis whether the particular invest-
ment approach meets the standard Here we cannot say that the record
does not adequately support the determination of the court below that retention
of the Sears stock, without diversification, was not imprudent.
Id. But see Baker Boyer Nat'l Bank v Garver, 719 P.2d 583, 588 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
(standing for proposition that fiduciary duty requires diversification of investments unless
special circumstances excuse failure to diversify).
191. Cf. Haskell, supra note 2, at 99 (asserting that failure to see diversification as
independent duty is "radically inconsistent with contemporary economic theory").
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. g (1992) (explaining duty to
diversify); see also supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text (discussing function of diver-
sification in portfolio theory).
193. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 438-39 (identifying adverse tax considerations,
inability to realize full value of property, or unique character of asset as among special
circumstances rendering diversification potentially imprudent).
194. Cf. Estate of Knipp, 414 A.2d 1007, 1009-10 (Pa. 1980) (Nix, J., dissenting)
(objecting to trustee's retention of stock in continuing hope for its market recovery despite
steadily increasing losses). Justice Nix observed that "[t]hese circumstances should have
forced the conclusion that some diversification was required to attempt to offset the possible
loss." Id. (Nix, J., dissenting).
195. See RESTATEmENT (TrifD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. g (1992) (explaining that mod-
em portfolio theory assesses prudence of trustee's investment by considering investment's
role in trust portfolio as whole, not m isolation).
196. See d. § 227(a) (articulating tirustee's duty to incorporate risk and return objectives
that are reasonably suitable to trust as part of basic standard of care, skill, and caution).
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modem financial analysis, a trustee can quantify the level of risk associated
with a given asset. 197 From these measurements, trustees can counterbalance
trust assets so as to virtually eliminate uncompensated risks. 19 Conversely,
a lack of adequate diversification can expose trust assets to unnecessary
risk. 199
By failing to diversify the portfolio m Krnpp, the trustee adopted an
extremely risky investment posture and, therefore, acted imprudently A
comparison of the Sears stock and the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index
supports this contention.' This comparison reveals that, during the rele-
vant period, the Sears stock was 60 % riskier than the overall market."l In
short, retaining the Sears stock as the dominant portfolio asset exposed the
overall portfolio to an alarming degree of uncompensated risk.' Under the
prudent investor rule, a court likely would find this strategy inappropriate
given the purpose behind Mr. Krupp's will and, thus, would impose the
surcharge.320
197 See Levy, supra note 58, at 13 (outlining techniques for measuring security's risk
as variability from its expected return).
198. Cf. Haskell, supra note 2, at 101 (remarking that diversification can virtually
eliminate specific risk); supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text (detailing role of port-
folio diversification).
199. See Levy, supra note 58, at 13-14 (demonstrating how portfolio composed
exclusively of government bonds possesses higher risk element than one that mixes bonds
with small capitalization stocks). But cf. Gordon, supra note 136, at 98 (advocating
diversification as means for avoiding risk of loss and increasing expected return at chosen
risk level).
200. Cf. Church & Snitzer, supra note 180, at 33 (comparing performance of Sears
Roebuck & Co. stock with Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index from January 1961 to
December 1972).
201. See id. (explaining that, on total return basis, Sears stock was 60% riskier than
Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index from January 1961 to December 1972).
202. Cf. Levy, supra note 58, at 16 (explaining that beta coefficient measures covaria-
tion between asset and market and that beta represents risk that diversification cannot elimm-
ate). Professor Levy explained that higher returns require a beta greater than 1.00. Id. at
16 n.60. The difference between the beta coefficient and 1.00 would equal uncompensated
risk. Id. In Krmpp, the difference between the beta coefficient and 1.00 was .60; therefore,
60% of the returns on the Sears Roebuck & Co. stock were uncompensated. C. Church
& Snitzer, supra note 180, at 33 (describing higher risk associated with Sears stock).
203. See Church & Snitzer, supra note 180, at 33 (criticizing Knipp decision). Church
and Snitzer stated: "It is not often that a fiduciary for widows and children takes 60 percent
greater risk than market, a risk comparable to the most aggressive portfolio managers." Id.
Accordingly, "it should be gross negligence, subject to surcharge, for a fiduciary to assume
the risk of Krupp, (i.e., 60 percent more risk than market), a risk level higher than the most
aggressive portfolios." Id. at 36.
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2. First Alabama Bank v Martin
First Alabama Bank v MartiriP provides an opportunity to con-
sider how the Restatement (Third) assesses the prudence of a trustee's
investment strategy 2 In this case, the Supreme Court of Alabama consid-
ered the prudence of certain investments made by a corporate trustee, First
Alabama Bank, on behalf of 1250 individual trusts.' The trustee used
assets from those trusts to invest in two common trust funds - a bond fund
and an equity fund.' The plaintiffs objected to investments m several
publicly traded "growth" stocks and the bonds of six highly leveraged real
estate investment trusts (REITs). 208 At trial, the court found each of these
investments to be imprudent, either with respect to the purchase or the
sale of the investments, and surcharged the bank over $2.6 million plus
interest.m
The state supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling.21  In so
doing, the court assessed each investment using a rigid security-by-security
approach advanced by the plaintiffs.211 At trial, expert testimony confirmed
204. 425 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1982).
205. First Alabama Bank v Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 417-29 (Ala. 1982) (analyzing
several investments made in two common trust funds).
206. Id. at 417
207 Id.
208. See id. at 418 (listing challenged investments and lower court's determination on
each investment). The challenged bond fund holdings included debentures of ATICO
Mortgage Investors, Barnett Mortgage Trust, Guardian Mortgage Investors, Justice Mort-
gage Investors, Midland Mortgage Investors, and Security Mortgage Investors. Id. The
challenged equity fund holdings included American Garden Products, Ames Department
Stores, Beverage Canners, CNA Financial, Elixir Industries, First Mortgage Investors, Hay-
A-Tampa, Kinney Services, Loomis Corporation, Mortgage Associates, Transamerica
Corporation, Umversal Oil Products, Wynn Oil Co., Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
Cox Broadcasting, Rust Craft Greeting Cards, and Sealed Power. Id.
209. Id. The court ordered the bank to pay $1,226,798.00 into the bond fund and
$1,426,354.88 into the equity fund. Id. The court also ordered interest on these sums. Id.
at 419.
210. Id. at 429.
211. Id. at 420. In evaluating each security, the court considered the following criteria:
(1) a minimum of $100 million in annual sales; (2) a current ratio of at least two
to one (current assets should be twice current liabilities); (3) a net working
capital to long-term debt ratio of at least one to one (net working capital being
current assets less current liabilities and long-term debt meaning obligations that
mature in more than one year); (4) earnings stability (positive earnings for the
last ten years); (5) a good dividend record; (6) an earnings growth measure of
at least one-third per share over a ten-year period, averaging the first three years
and the last three years to remove extremes; (7) a moderate price earnings ratio
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that this approach would disqualify most publicly traded securities as
imprudent investments.212 Nevertheless, the Alabama court found that,
although the REIT bonds paid high rates of interest, they carried an mordi-
nate degree of risk 13 and that such risk taking clearly violated the prudent
person rule.214 Likewise, the court found the stocks to be unnecessarily
risky 215 The court characterized these investments as speculative because,
as growth company stocks, each focused solely on increased returns. 216
Thus, despite the potential for higher income, the trustee breached its duty
of caution by failing to preserve the trust corpus.217
Arguably, applying the prudent investor rule would alter this out-
come.211 In Martin, the court seemed indifferent to both the percentage of
the portfolio devoted to the challenged investments and the overall com-
position of the portfolio.219 Rather, the court considered each investment
in isolation.' The prudent investor rule rejects this method."
of no more than fifteen to one; and (8) a moderate ratio of price to assets of no
more than one and one half to one.
Id. at 419-20. In contrast, the bank used the following criteria to evaluate each purchase:
(1) a rating of B+ or better by Standard & Poor's (B+ is an average rating and B is a
speculative rating); (2) a minmum of 1.5 million shares of stock m the hands of the public;
and (3) annual sales of at least $100 million. Id. at 419.
212. See zd. at 419-21 (describing respective investment standards used by parties). The
plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Robert Johnston, conceded on cross-examination that only five
of the thrty stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average would meet the criteria employed
by the court in considering the challenged investments. Id. at 420.
213. Id. at 421.
214. See id. at 429 (finding no error m lower court's holding against trustee for six
RE1T purchases).
215. Id. at 427-28.
216. See id. at 427 (concluding that trustee did not consistently use long-term invest-
ment standards in making stock purchases); cf. Willis, supra note 134, at 229 (indicating
that investments held for long period of time to produce income are not imprudent).
217 Martin, 425 So. 2d at 429.
218. See Aalberts & Poon, supra note 69, at 51-52 (discussing Martin decision and
concluding that "it is highly unlikely that under [the Restatement (Third)] the foregoing cases
[including the Martin decision] would be treated as they were").
219. See Gordon, supra note 136, at 71 (remarking on Martin court's indifference to
proportion of challenged investments m portfolio and to makeup of portfolio as whole).
220. See Martin, 425 So. 2d at 420 (reviewing several common trust fund investments
by corporate trustee and finding each to be too speculative).
221. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. b (1992) (explaining that use
of trust's performance or hindsight is inappropriate when judging trustee's investment
conduct). The Restatement (Turd) states that "[tihe trustee is not a guarantor of the trust's
investment performance." Id., see also Donovan v Walton, 609 F Supp. 1221, 1228
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The logic of the prudent investor rule is simple: The burden mposed
by requiring trustees to monitor each investment individually prompts
trustees to limit the number of holdings.'m Such underdiversification
creates greater overall risk and lower rates of return for the portfolio.'
Under the prudent investor rule, the Martin court would have considered
how the decisions surrounding the purchases of the challenged investments
fit into the larger strategy of the two common trust funds. From this
broader perspective, the court would have seen that some of the investments
were both prudent and reasonable. z' In all likelihood, then, the Alabama
court would have reduced the surcharge.
3. In re Bank of New York (Spitzer)
In re Bank of New York (Spitzer)p illustrates how a court might apply
the prudent investor rule's anti-netting provision.' In this case, the New
York Court of Appeals considered a challenge to four investments held in
a common trust fund. '3 During the four-year accounting period m ques-
tion, the fund as a whole experienced a gross gain of $1.7 million with
losses of $2 38 ,0 00 .1 The Surrogate 9 granted summary judgment for the
(S.D. Fla. 1985) (deciding that imprudent conduct, not poor investment result, is basis
for trustee liability); Stark v United States Trust Co., 445 F Supp. 670, 678 (S.D.N.Y
1978) (same).
222. See Cheris, supra note 49, at 340 (criticizing requirement that trustees monitor
investments separately as leading to underdiversification).
223. Cf. Levy, supra note 58, at 13-14 (illustrating dangers of underdiversification).
224. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. k, reporter's notes (1992)
(explaining that, even within total portfolio context, Martin court correctly found some of
challenged investments too risky; however, court's findings as to remaining investments
depended exclusively on rigid and arbitrary criteria).
225. 323 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y 1974).
226. In re Bank of New York (Spitzer), 323 N.E.2d 700, 701-04 (N.Y 1974) (consid-
ering losses sustained with respect to four investments by fiduciary); cf. Gordon, supra note
136, at 97 (pointing to Bank of New York (Spitzer) as possible application of prudent investor
rule's anti-netting standard).
227 Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d at 701.
228. Id. at 702.
229. "Surrogate" is "[t]he name given in some of the states to the judge or judicial
officer who has jurisdiction over the administration of probate matters, guardianships,
etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1445 (6th ed. 1990). With respect to New York, Black's
adds:
In New York the Surrogate's Court has jurisdiction over all actions and proceed-
ings related to the affainrs of decedents, probate of wills, administration of estates
and actions and proceedings arising thereunder or pertaining thereto, guardian-
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bank on only two of the challenged investments." However, the appellate
division held for the bank on all four mvestments,"i and the court of
appeals affinmed 3 2
In deciding that the bank acted prudently, the court of appeals rejected
the basis for the appellate division's ruling - that the net gain to the trust
precluded any need for a surcharge. 3 The court of appeals explained that
net increases should not insulate the trustee from being held accountable for
all of its investment decisions. 4 The court reasoned that if trustees had
this kind of immunity in rising markets, it might encourage unwarranted
risk taking in an effort to recover other losses. 5 Ironically, this reasoning
cultivated wider judicial acceptance of portfolio theory by recognizing that
any determination of the safety of a specific investment decision must
consider that investment in relation to the portfolio as a whole. 6
ship of the property of minors, and such other actions and proceedings, not with-
m the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court, as may be provided by law.
Id.
230. Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d at 702. The Surrogate granted summary judgment
for the bank in regard to investments m Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. and Mercantile
Stores Company, Inc. and denied summary judgment as to the investments m Boeing
Company and Parke, Davis & Company Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 704. The court of appeals observed that, for each investment, "the trustee
acted in good faith and cannot be said to have failed to exercise 'such diligence and such
prudence m the care and management of the fund, as m general, prudent men of discretion
and intelligence employ m their own like affairs.'" Id. (citations omitted).
233. Id. at 703.
234. Id. The court of appeals observed:
The fact that this portfolio showed substantial overall increase m total value
during the accounting period does not insulate the trustee from responsibility for
imprudence with respect to individual investments for which it would otherwise
be surcharged. To hold to the contrary would in effect be to assure fiduciary
immunity in an advancing market
Id., cf Gordon, supra note 136, at 97 (agreeing with court's decision not to insulate trustees
from liability despite overall increases m portfolio value).
235. See Gordon, supra note 136, at 97 (commenting that if Bank of New York had held
otherwise it would have encouraged unwarranted risk taking by trustees to recoup from
errors); cf Halbach, supra note 8, at 458 (noting policy concern that allowing losses to be
offset with profits could encourage multiple breaches of trust).
236. See In re Bank of New York (Spitzer), 323 N.E.2d 700, 703 (N.Y 1974) (warn-
ing against assessing investments as if segregated from rest of portfolio). The court stated:
The record of any individual investment is not to be viewed exclusively, of
course, as though it were in its own watertight compartment, since to some
extent individual investment decisions may properly be affected by considerations
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Despite criticism that it unpedes the use of modem portfolio theory, 2 7
the anti-netting approach to damages suggested by the Bank of New York
decision appears as a part of the prudent investor rule.231 However, the
prudent investor rule modifies the anti-netting approach to avoid unneces-
sary harshness in dealing with good faith breaches.239 For example, a
trustee arguably could commit a good faith breach by purchasing an unusu-
ally risky investment for purposes of diversification.' ° Yet, the prudent
investor rule encourages trustees to make such purchases regularly to
enhance portfolio performance. 4 By focusing its decision on whether the
trustee acted m good faith, and not on whether the gain exceeded the loss,
the Bank of New York decision likely would remain undisturbed under the
prudent investor rule.4 2 Moreover, the prudent investor rule would facili-
of the performance of the fund as an entity, as m this instance, for example, of
individual security decisions based m part on considerations of diversification of
the fund or of capital transactions to achieve sound tax planning for the fund as
a whole. The focus of inquiry, however, is nonetheless on the individual security
as such and factors relating to the entire portfolio are to be weighed only along
with others in reviewing the prudence of the particular investment decisions.
Id., cf. Cheris, supra note 49, at 340 (referring to Bank of NewYork as first decision to hint
at applicability of modem portfolio theory to fiduciary investment responsibilities).
237 See Ipsen, supra note 4, at 450 (commenting that anti-netting rule is at odds with
modem portfolio theory). But see Gordon, supra note 136, at 97 (concluding that anti-
netting rule is not mconsistent with modem portfolio theory); Halbach, supra note 8, at 457
(contesting belief that anti-netting rule inhibits reliance on modem portfolio theory).
238. See RSrATEMENT(HD) OF TRuSTs § 213 (1992) (continuing traditional support
for anti-netting rule with some modifications).
239. See Halbach, supra note 8, at 458 (finding that revised anti-netting rule avoids
being overly punitive m dealing with good faith breaches).
240. See Gordon, supra note 136, at 97 (concluding that breach of trust does not occur
with purchase of security or instrument that appears particularly volatile when viewed m
isolation).
241. See id. (noting that rational portfolio strategy requires diversification). Professor
Gordon commented:
A misapplied anti-netting rule would make portfolio theory unpossible to use,
for the very essence of a portfolio strategy is diversification such that losses will
be balanced out by gains in a way that makes the overall portfolio less risky and
the overall returns more dependable. It is a rational portfolio strategy to
include some securities whose expected returns are negative, if, for example, in
unusually difficult economic times their returns are positive and will balance out
losses on the rest of the portfolio.
Id.
242. Cf. In re Bank of New York (Spitzer), 323 N.E.2d 700, 701-04 (N.Y 1974)
(concluding that trustee acted in good faith with respect to purchase, retention, and sale of
challenged investments); Gordon, supra note 136, at 67 (noting that application of prudent
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tate this result by clarifying the means for determining the prudence of a
particular investment under sinilar circumstances2 3
B. The Response Among the States
Prior to the adoption of the Restatement (Third) m 1992, several states
amended their fiduciary admimstration statutes to incorporate modem
investment principles. These revisions generally enable, but do not require,
trustees to follow the tenets of modem portfolio theory 244 The statutes also
emphasize a total-portfolio standard of care similar to that described m Sec-
tions 227-229 of the Restatement (Third).245 The states that have amended
their fiduciary administration statutes m advance of the Restatement (Third)
include Delaware,24 Georgia,247 Minnesota,' and Tennessee. 9
Begimmng m 1991, four other states modified their statutes to reflect
the new standards found in both the draft and final versions of the
Restatement (Third).'5  These states include Florida,"' Illinois, 2 New
investor rule does not require courts to overrule past cases, but merely to re-interpret them
in light of new standard).
243. See Taylor, supra note 26, at 63 (noting that new version of anti-netting rule offers
considerable assurance of no penalties for trustees who commit modest portions of portfolio
to high risk or underproductive ventures so long as such investments fit reasonably into
diversified overall strategy when made); cf Chase v. Pevear, 383 Mass. 350, 362-70 (1981)
(supporting, in dicta, principles underlying revised anti-netting standard); Gordon, supra
note 136, at 97 (citing revised anti-nettig rule as means for deciding prudence of particular
investment).
244. See RESTATEMENT (THIR) OF TRUSTS § 227, reporter's note (1992) (introducing
discussion of recent state legislation updating rules of prudent investing).
245. See id. (comparing several state statutes passed prior to ALI's adoption of Restate-
ment (Third)).
246. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302 (1986) (describing state's prudent investment
standards for fiduciaries).
247 See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-8,-2 (1995 & Supp. 1996) (describing state's prudent
investment standards for executors and trustees).
248. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.10 (West 1990) (describing state's prudent
investment standards for trustees). As of January 1, 1997, Minnesota repealed the fore-
going statute and adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA). Id. § 501B.151 (West
Supp. 1997) (codifying UPIA).
249. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-3-117 (1996) (describing state's prudent investment
standards for fiduciaries).
250. See Langbem, supra note 149, at 116 (noting that, in 1991, Illinois loosely pat-
terned its prudent investor rule on Restatement (Third)).
251. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (describing state's
prudent investment standards for fiduciaries).
252. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 515-515.1 (West 1992) (describing state's prudent
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York,2s3 and Virgima.A Given that these statutes are the first codifications
of the prudent investor rule, they merit close consideration.
Of these four statutes, the Illinois and Florida versions are most slim-
lar.5 Although each statute differs considerably from the language of the
Restatement (Third), each carefully mlmics its substance355 However, both
of these statutes contain two important distinctions that set their versions of
the prudent investor rule apart from the Restatement (Third).
First, both Florida and Illinois require a fiduciary to notify the benefi-
ciaries in writing prior to any delegation of the investment functions.357
The Restatement (Third) mandates no such requirement.5 8 With respect to
these notification provisions, the statutes also differ from one another.
Florida asks for notification "within 30 days of the delegation," whereas
Illinois requires notice "at least 30 days before the delegation."' , This
difference makes the Florida notice requirement somewhat more perims-
sive.
investment standards for trustees). Illinois recently amended this statute to empower trustees
to invest in mutual funds. Id. § 5/5.2 (West Supp. 1996).
253. See N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRuSTS LAw § 11-2.3 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (describ-
ing state's prudent investment standards for trustees).
254. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1 (Michie 1992) (describing state's prudent invest-
ment standards for fiduciaries).
255. See Jerold I. Horn, Prudent Investor Rule: Impact on Drafting and Administration
of Trusts, C891 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 235, 244 (1994) (concluding that Florida and Illinois
versions of prudent investor rule are more similar to each other than to Restatement (Third)).
See generally Philip N. Hablutzel, May an Attorney in Illinois Be a Trustee?, 83 ILL. B.J.
22 (1995) (offering overview of Illinois prudent investor legislation).
256. See Horn, supra note 255, at 244 (noting that Florida and Illinois versions of
prudent investor rule are similar in substance to Restatement (Third); however, each statute's
language differs considerably from language of Restatement (Third)).
257 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.112(2)(c) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring written notice
to beneficianes before delegation of investment functions); see also 760 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/5.1(b)(6) (West 1992) (requiring written notice to beneficiaries prior to delegation
of investment functions); cf Allard v Pacific Nat'l Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 110 (Wash. 1983)
(finding that fiduciary's overall conduct, mcluding failure to inform beneficiaries prior to
sale of sole trust asset, constituted breach of fiduciary duty), amended by 773 P.2d 420
(Wash. 1989).
258. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt a (1992) (explaining that
decisions by trustees concerning delegation are matters of fiduciary judgment and discre-
tion).
259. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.112(2)(c) (West Supp.. 1997) (requiring written
notice to beneficiaries within 30 days of delegation of investment functions), with 760 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5.1(b)(6) (West 1992) (requiring written nonce to beneficiaries at least
30 days prior to delegation of investment functions).
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Second, the Florida and Illinois versions arguably impose a weaker
duty to diversify than does the Restatement (Third).' The Restatement
(Third) requires diversification unless special circumstances make diversifi-
cation mprudent.?1 Given that modem portfolio theory considers diversifi-
cation essential to prudent investing,'s 2 such special circumstances rarely
exist.263 In contrast, both Florida and Illinois dispense with the duty to
diversify if the fiduciary possesses a reasonable belief that nondiversi-
fication is m the trust's best interest.' This curious distinction appears to
create a more subjective standard regarding the trustee's decision to diver-
sify 2
Compared to Florida and Illinois, Virguua adopted only modest
revisions to its prudent investor statute.' Most notably, aside from requir-
ing a fiduciary to consider individual investments within the context of the
whole portfolio, the Virginia statute offers little guidance as to other invest-
ment considerations 67 Nor does it make any express provision for the
260. See Horn, supra note 255, at 245 (suggesting that Florida and Illinois versions of
prudent investor rule may impose weaker duty of diversification than Restatement (Third)
imposes).
261. See REsTATEMENT (HiD) OF TRusTs § 227(b) (1992) (mandating diversification
of trust assets unless, under certain circumstances, it is prudent not to do so).
262. See id. § 227 cmt. g (identifying reduction of uncompensated risk through
diversification as central feature of prudence).
263. Cf. id. (explaining that justifying drastic departures from reasonable degree of
diversification requires sound basis, such as unusual investment objectives needing major
commitment of trust assets for particular enterprise).
264. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11(1)(c) (West Supp. 1997) (imposing duty to
diversify unless fiduciary reasonably believes it is in best interest of beneficiaries and
furthers purposes of trust not to diversify); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 515(a)(3) (West
1992) (same).
265. Cf. Horn, supra note 255, at 245 (calling possibly lesser duty to diversify in
Florida and Illinois "curious" departure from main themes of prudent investor rule).
266. C. Langbem, supra note 149, at 116 (characterizing Virginia's 1992 revision of
its prudent investor statute as modest).
267 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11(1)(f) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing fiduciary to
consider general economic conditions, possible effects of inflation, expected tax conse-
quences, expected total return, and duty to incur only reasonable costs when making
investment decisions); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5(a)(6) (West 1992) (same); N.Y EST.
PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 11-2.3(b)(3)(B) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (requiring consideration
of size of portfolio, nature and estimated duration of fiduciary relationship, liquidity and
distribution requirements of governing instrument, general economic conditions, possible
effects of inflation or deflation, expected tax consequences, expected total returns, and needs
of beneficianes for present and future distributions as part of investment decisions). But see
VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1(A) (Michie 1992) (requiring only consideration of individual
investments in context of investment portfolio as whole).
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delegation of investment functions. Tis omission stands in sharp contrast
to the Florida, Illinois, and New York statutes.68 Finally, although the
Virginia statute authorizes the fiduciary to acquire and retain every type of
property and investment that a prudent person would,'9 it does not impose
any duty with respect to the original assets of the trust. Again, the absence
of this feature distinguishes the Virgima statute from the other three stat-
utes.27 Thus, although the Virginia prudent investor statute now incorpo-
rates portfolio theory, it fails to include several key features of the Restate-
ment (Third) that facilitate the application of the theory As a result, the
Virginia statute represents only nominal progress over the prudent person
standard that it replaces.
The New York statutePn is the most comprehensive of the four stat-
utes.' This specificity stems from its relatively late enactment's and the
resultant ability to draw on both the Restatement (Third) and the then-
proposed Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA)z4 for its structure. 5 As
268. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.112(1) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing delegation of
investment functions when prudent investor of comparable skills would delegate); see also 760
ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/5.1(a) (West 1992) (imposing duty not to delegate except for
investment functions that prudent investor of comparable skills would delegate under same
circumstances); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(4)(C) (McKinney Supp. 1997)
(authorizing delegation of investment and management functions if consistent with trustee's
duty to exercise skill).
269. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1(A) (Michie 1992) (authorizing fiduciary to acquire
and retain every land of property - real, personal, or mxed - and every kind of investment
that persons of prudence, discretion, and intelligence would acquire and retain for their own
account under same circumstances).
270. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.1 1(1)(d) (West Supp. 1997) (imposing duty on fiduciary
to review investment portfolio and to make and implement decisions concerning retention and
disposition of pre-existing investments); 760 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/5(a)(4) (West 1992)
(same); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(3)(D) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (re-
quiring trustee to determine whether to retain or dispose of initial assets within reasonable time
after creation of fiduciary relationship).
271. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (describing
state's prudent investment standards for trustees).
272. See generally Joshua S. Rubenstein, 1994 New York State Legislative Changes
Affecting Estate Planning, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 37 (1995) (describing passage of New York
prudent investor statute).
273. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (making
statute applicable to any investment made or held by trustee on or after January 1, 1995). The
Florida, Illinois, and Virginia prudent investor statutes took effect in 1993, 1991, and 1992,
respectively. See UNIF PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1996) (isting dates
Florida, Illinois, and Virginia enacted prudent investor statutes).
274. See generally UNIF PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1996) (making
available complete text of proposed UPIA).
275. See Sanford J. Schlesinger & Arlene Hams, Prudent Investor Act Becomes Law,
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a result, the statute eases fiduciaries into the role of "investors" of trust
property with very explicit standards and language.276
In so doing, the New York version differs from its three compamon
statutes in several significant respects. First, unlike Florida and Illinois, the
New York statute holds fiduciaries with special investment skills to a higher
standard of care and diligence. ' This provision flows directly from
standards for professional fiduciaries set out in the Restatement (Thzrd).278
Second, unlike the other states, New York codifies the requirement of cost-
consciousness with respect to both trust investments and adminstration. z79
Finally, New York does not insulate a fiduciary from the actions and
decisions of a delegate, as do Florida and Illinois.' Instead, the New
York statute imposes on the delegate a fiduciary duty to the trustee and
invalidates any attempt to exonerate the delegate from that duty 1 Gener-
ally speaking, these differences allow the New York statute to reflect more
accurately the full spirit of the Restatement (Third). These differences also
make the statute slightly more stringent than its counterparts with respect
to the fiduciary's duties.
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1994, at 1 (explaining that New York statute draws on Restatement (Third),
recent Illinois legislation, and preliminary version of UPIA).
276. Cf. Edward V Atnally, Prudent Investor Act: Its Effect on Executors, 67 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 12, 12 (1995) (noting that new statute moves executors away from traditional role as
conservators of estate assets and into role as investors).
277 Compare N.Y. EST. POWERS& TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1997)
(requiring fiduciaries with special investment skills to exercise those skills m investing and
managing assets), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11(1)(a) (West Supp. 1997) (imposing duty on
fiduciaries with special investment skills to use those skills). See generally Rubenstem, supra
note 272, at 37 (noting that 1995 New York Prudent Investor Act holds fiduciaries with special
investment skills to higher standard).
278. C. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. d (1992) (explaining that, if trustee
possesses degree of skill greater than that of individual of ordinary intelligence, trustee is liable
for loss that results from failure to make reasonably diligent use of that skill).
279. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(4)(D) (McKinney Supp. 1997)
(authorizing fiduciary to mcur costs only to extent it is appropriate and reasonable in relation
to purposes of governing instrument, assets held by trustee, and skill of trustee).
280. See Schlesinger & Hams, supra note 275, at 7 (noting that provision was controver-
sial late amendment to legislation requested by state attorney general for protection of benefi-
ciarnes). But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.112(3) (West Supp. 1997) (releasing fiduciary from
responsibility for agent's investment decisions or actions if fiduciary meets general require-
ments for delegation); 760 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/5.1(c) (West 1992) (releasing trustee
from liability for investment decisions or actions of investment agent after satisfying all
requirements for delegation).
281. See N.Y EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(c)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1997)
(imposing on delegate duty to exercise delegated function with reasonable care, skill, and
caution, and calling any attempt to exonerate delegate from liability for failure to meet duty
as contrary to public policy and void).
379
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The UPIA is the most recent statutory development to address the
general concern about rigid fiduciary investment practices.tm The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the UPIA
m 1994.1 The American Bar Association approved the UPIA in February
1995 ' By standardizing five fundamental alterations to the criteria for
prudent investing,' the UPIA facilitates the implementation of the Restate-
ment (Third)'s main principles.'
Section 2 is the heart of the UPIA. In general, the language in this
section loosely follows that of Section 227 of the Restatement (Third), the
Illinois statute, and Section 7-302 of the Uniform Probate Code.' In pro-
viding a uniform standard of care, Section 2 stresses that different beneficia-
ries have different needs and, therefore, that the risk level of each investment
strategy should correspond to the individual purposes of the trust. 289 Simi-
larly, Section 2 draws a distinction between amateur and professional trustee-
ship and sets the standard for professionals higher than that for non-
professionals.2' As a result, Section 2 attempts to be sensitive to the needs
of every trust, regardless of its size. 291
282. See generally UNIF PRUDENT INVESTOR AcT, 7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1996) (setting
forth complete text, prefatory note, and comments).
283. See id. (listing date of approval by National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws).
284. See John H. Langbem, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IowA L. REV 641, 641 (1996) (reporting February 1995 adoption of UPIA by
American Bar Association).
285. See UNIF PRUDENT INVESTOR AcT, 7B U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 1996) (stating the
objectives of UPIA). The UPIA identifies the criteria for prudent investing as (1) the use of
a total portfolio rather than an individual investment process; (2) an appreciation for tradeoffs
between risks and returns; (3) the removal of restrictions that bar certain types of investments;
(4) an enhanced duty to diversify investments; and (5) the elimination of the former prohibition
on delegation. Id.
286. See Langbein, supra note 149, at 116 (noting that UPIA seeks to implement main
principles of Restatement (Third)).
287 See UNIF PRUDENT INVESMR ACT § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 22 (Supp. 1996) (highlight-
ing overall importance of UPIA Section 2).
288. See id. (identifying similarity between language of UPIA Section 2 and several other
authorities relating to prudent investing).
289. See id. (stressing that risk level of investment strategy should correspond with both
needs of beneficiary and purposes of trust). The comment to Section 2 of the UPIA notes that
a "trust whose main purpose is to support an elderly widow of modest means will have a lower
risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great wealth." Id.
290. See id. (concluding that, because standard of prudence is relative, it follows that
standard for professionals is that of prudent professionals; for amateurs, it is that of prudent
amateurs).
291. Qf. id. (commenting that UPIA emphasizes factors that are sensitive to traits of small
trusts, including needs for varying risk-return objectives and levels of expertise among trustees).
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As noted above, several states already have taken steps to benefit from
the current perspective on prudent fiduciary investment found in the Restate-
ment (Third). However, given that a large majority of states continue to rely
on the prudent person rule, these states are the exception. Nevertheless, as
of 1996, several states have enacted the UPIA.29  Those states include
Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washing-
ton.2' Hopefully, by distilling the principles of the Restatement (Third) into
a succinct working model, the UPIA will enable the remaining states to move
more easily to tins improved investment standard.
VI. Conclusion
Under the prudent investor rule, trust doctrine returns to the flexible
standard advanced in Harvard College.294 In so doing, the prudent investor
rule tries to monitor fiduciary investments closely without restricting the trus-
tee's ability to respond effectively to the uncertainty of a dynamic economy 295
With trusts beginning to play an increasingly important role in our society,
those states without such a fiduciary investment standard should immediately
292. See Langbein, supra note 284, at 641-42 (listing states that adopted UPIA in 1995).
293. See ARiz. REv STAT. ANN. §§ 14-7601 to -7611 (West Supp. 1996) (adopting sev-
eral sections of UPIA); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16045-16054 (West Supp. 1996) (same); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-1.1-101 to -115 (West Supp. 1995) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-
7-601 to -612 (Michle 1978 & Supp. 1995) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 175.60-.72
(West Supp. 1997) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-7-302 to -303 (Supp. 1996) (same);
WASH. REv CODE ANN. § 11.100.010-.130 (West Supp. 1997) (same).
294. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTS, introduction (1992) (describing prudent
investor rule as modest reformulation of original Harvard College standard).
295. But see Haskell, supra note 2, at 110-11 (arguing that uncertain economuc times
caution against expanding use of modem portfolio theory under prudent investor rule to private
trusts). Professor Haskell warned:
At the present time the economic landscape is a mine field. There are large
perennial federal budget deficits and an enormous federal debt. There are large
perennial trade deficits. There is a huge and growing foreign investment in our
federal debt and in our economy. Our major banks have huge loans of question-
able value to third world countries. Some of our major industries have great
difficulty competing with foreign products. The economic impact of the European
Community remains to be seen. Elementary and secondary education in this
country is a disaster area. Many of our older cities have rotting infrastructures
(bridges, sewer lines, water mains, gas lines). The social pathology of our urban
centers worsens. Unless the business cycle is obsolete, a recession is long
overdue. When this nation decides to face up to the reality of its situation, it will
be enormously expensive, with uncertain consequences. I would suggest that
anyone who is daring with another's money in these circumstances is not acting
responsibly.
Id. at 110.
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implement legislation reflecting the wisdom of the Restatement (Third).
Fueling the urgency of this recommendation are several ongoing demo-
graphic shifts that increase the need for flexible trust management. 297 First,
private wealth m this country has increased dramatically m recent years.298
Moreover, this newer wealth differs considerably m form from private
wealth of the past.2' Whereas previous generations had wealth comprised
primarily of tangible property - like farms - people today invest their
money in financial assets3" - like stocks and bonds.3"' In fact, for many
Americans, pension plan benefits - a form of wealth composed almost
entirely of marketable securities' - constitute their largest asset.'
296. Cy. UNr. PRUDENT INVESmR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 1996) (discussing adoption
of prudent investor statutes in several states both before and after issuance of Restatement
(Third)); J. Timothy Ritchie, Is the Prudent Person Rule Obsolete?, TR. & EST., Jan. 1989,
at 28, 65 (concluding that it is time to update prudent person rule to enable fiduciaries to
maximize returns for all beneficiaries).
297 Cf. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
571 (5th ed. 1995) (concluding that increasing personal wealth creates increasing needs for
property management); Carolyn T. Geer, Trust a Trust, FORBES, Aug. 14, 1995, at 168, 168
(calling trust necessity for middle class). See generally John H. Langbem, The Twentieth-
Centuy Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REv 722 (1988) (discussing
enormous demographic shifts over last century affecting estate planning for persons with
middle and upper-middle incomes).
298. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 297, at 571 (illustrating recent increase
in private wealth with Federal Reserve data). In 1991, American banks held more than $450
billion in some 900,000 irrevocable trusts, with individual trustees managing billions more.
Id., cf. Cristina Merrill, N.Y. Law Seen Widening Trust Marketfor Banks, AM. BANKER, May
15, 1995, at 17 (citing estimates that $6 to $10 trillion will pass from older to younger
generation in next 25 years).
299. See John H. Langbem, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV L. REV 1108, 1119 (1984) (concluding that "bulk of modem wealth
takes form of contract rights rather than rights in rem"). Professor Langbem observed:
"Promissory instruments - stocks, bonds, mutual funds, bank deposits, and pension and
insurance rights - are dominant component of today's private wealth." Id.
300. C. Langbem, supra note 297, at 729 (explaining how movement to complex indus-
trial economy encourages today's family to invest its wealth m financial instruments); id. at
739 (describing financial assets as "distinctly modem form of property that was still of
peripheral importance m last century").
301. See Kathy L. Anderson & Brian W Smith, Banks Explore Options on Trust Conver-
sions as Congress Deliberates, 21 BANKING POL'Y REP 19, 19 (1993) (reporting growth of
mutual funds). A recent count revealed that there are approximately four thousand mutual
funds in the United States, with total assets approaching $2 trillion. Id.
302. See Langbem, supra note 297, at 739 (noting that financial assets comprise majority
of pension funds); cf. id. at 740 (illustrating that, as of 1984, pension funds owned 22.8% of
U.S. equity securities and about half of all corporate debt in United States).
303. See id. at 740 (revealing that pension wealth is largest asset for many middle and
upper-middle class families).
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Second, the average life expectancy is significantly greater than ever
before.' Whereas shorter lifetimes formerly obviated the need for a stream
of retirement income, our increasing longevity makes such income crucial
today o Similarly, with longer life also has come the fear of prolonged
incapacity and its attendant medical expenses. 3°6 Together, these trends
signal a fundamental change m the needs of many trust beneficiaries.
Historically, trusts worked to accumulate and transfer wealth from one
generation to the next using "dynastic" estate plans." ° Today, however, the
trends described above encourage estate planning that uses private wealth
to provide the income needed to guard against premature death, old age,
or incapacity 30I As the considerable growth in trust management suggests, 3"
trusts play an increasingly central role m such planning. 1 o However, as the
needs of beneficiaries become more oriented toward income,"' inflation's
304. See d. (describing advances m medicine and sanitation as reason for 66% increase
in average life expectancy since 1900). In fact, some researchers believe that the eventual
norm of the human life span will be approximately 85 years. Id.
305. See rd. (explaining that, in previous century, life expectancy was such that one was
not likely to need much retirement income).
306. Cf. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 297, at 641 (discussing increasing
necessity for use of support trusts m dealing with incapacity).
307 See generally Jerry A. Kasner, A Trust Law Professor's Perspective, TR. & EST.,
May 1995, at 58 (expressing opinion that most clients do not use trusts to effect "dynastic"
estate plans that accumulate large amounts of wealth for succeeding generations).
308. See Langbem, supra note 297, at 750 (concluding that estate planning services for
middle and upper-middle class persons resemble contingency planning in which client's
primary concern is to make arrangement for client's family in unlikely event of premature
death); see also Todd, supra note 79, at 281 (stating that "virtually all estate and tax attorneys
have clients who rely on trusts to grow and preserve assets for their heirs or to provide
sufficient retirement income").
309. See Langbem, supra note 297, at 740 (estimating total assets of nonfederal pension
plans at approximately $2 trillion); see also Geer, supra note 297, at 168 (illustrating middle
class's increased use of trusts by pointing to formation of 60 independent trust companies since
1990, including several by discount brokers and fund operators such as PaineWebber and
Fidelity Investments). Emphasizing the growing use of trusts, Geer noted that "[from a
standing start five years ago, [Charles Schwab & Co.] now has $23 billion m personal trust
assets." Id.
310. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trusts in Estate Planning, 2 PROB. LAW 1, 1 (1975)
(noting utility of trusts). Professor Halbach concluded:
Thus, the trust plays a central role in modem estate planning and has utility in
nearly every family situation. It is indeed a rare client who should not at least
senously consider the use of a trust for some circumstances, even if only to cover
certain contingencies that ought to be anticipated.
Id.
311. See Dobns, supra note 73, at 400 (using results of focus group meetings conducted
by American Association of Retired Persons to illustrate that most investors favor safety and
income above all else).
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potentially corrosive effect on the trust corpus needed to generate that income
poses greater concern.312 Therefore, to fulfill their fiduciary obligations,
trustees must have the managerial flexibility needed to address this concern. 313
To this end, every state should enact legislation that adopts the primary
elements of the prudent investor rule as described m the Restatement (7hird).
However, given that the complex features of ths new standard are, in part,
counterintuitive to traditional notions of prudence, 14 legislatures must care-
fully consider the policy implications raised by such a transition. 15 To aid
m this effort, lawmakers should draw upon three resources.
First, the UPIA offers foundational guidance m the practical application
of the complexities underlying the prudent investor rule. Consequently, the
UPIA provides an excellent framework from which to begin structuring a
move to a modern fiduciary investment standard. Second, by looking to
statutes already passed m other states, legislators may gain an understanding
of how those states addressed localized concerns not reflected in the more
general language of the UPIA. Where states share those concerns, such an
understanding will assist legislators m tailoring a prudent investor standard
that better fits local interests.
Finally, each state should consider the model provided by ERISA.316
Passed m 1974, ERISA predates both the Restatement (Third) and the UPIA.
As such, it represents the first attempt to use modern portfolio theory in
combating the detrimental effects of inflation on pension trust funds.
3 17
312. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing effects of inflation on
interest-bearing investments).
313. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, introduction (1992) (stating that rules
governing fiduciary investments must be flexible and general enough to adapt to changes in
financial world); cf Cheris, supra note 49, at 342 (contending that today's fiduciary is usually
sophisticated investment manager who possesses talent, knowledge, and skill and, therefore,
requires less judicial paternalism).
314. See Haskell, supra note 2, at 103 (describing logic of modem portfolio theory as
"counterintuitive"); cf. Gordon, supra note 136, at 90 (arguing that complexity of modem
portfolio model has slowed its acceptance by judiciary).
315. Cf. Gordon, supra note 136, at 93 (describing how uncertainty over propriety of
investments under prudent investor standard will make monitoring of trustee performance more
problematic); Ritchie, supra note 296, at 65 (suggesting that prudent investor's conduct may
be significantly different from conduct of prudent person under prudent person rule).
316. C. Sharon Reece & Mary Beth Navin, Regulating Public Pension Fund Investments:
The Role of Federal Legislation, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 101, 107 (1992) (noting that several
statutes have already incorporated fiduciary rules of ERISA).
317 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing influence of ERISA); cf.
Bobo, supra note 27, at 1077 (linking ERISA standard of prudence to common-law prudent
investor rule); Ron Kilgard, Lord Jim Faces Up to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, AmiZ. ATT'Y, Aug.-Sept. 1995, at 16, 18 (attributing standard of prudence found
in ERISA § 404(a) to Harvard College holding).
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Moreover, ERISA expresses perhaps the most sophisticated statement of the
prudent investor standard.3 18  As the rising demand for retirement income
causes the needs of pension and trust beneficiaries to merge,
3 19 so too will
the responsibilities of their respective fiduciaries. 32 Therefore, lawmakers
should understand the interplay that exists between the theory underlying
ERISA and the prudent investor rule advanced in both the Restatement
(Third) and the UPIA.32
By developing standards of prudent investment that reflect the latest
thinking on the subject, the Restatement (Third) considerably advances
conventional trust doctrine. With tis advance, fiduciaries are now free to
safeguard trust portfolios against the fluctuations that attend the increasingly
global marketplace. 3" More importantly, by instituting the Restatement
(Third) and its prudent investor rule as a common feature in fiduciary invest-
ment standards, trustees can post a more vigilant watch for those devils that
may lurk m the century ahead.
318. See Arthur H. Kroll, Nontraditional Investments Under ERISA: Panmng for Gold,
PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 23 (commenting that ERISA plan fiduciaries are subject
to review under "the most sophisticated expression of prudence to have attained the force of
law" (quoting LONGSTRETH, supra note 51, at 34)). But see Kilgard, supra note 317, at 17
(placing ERISA among most complicated American statutes ever enacted).
319. Cf. Bobo, supra note 27, at 1098 (concluding that, with respect to investment
concerns, personal trusts and employee pension plans have few differences); Sherwin P
Simmons, Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts: A Current Perspective, C966 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1,
13 (1994) (suggesting that, in light of prudent investor standard, ERISA fiduciary litigation
decisions will influence case law governing personal trusts). But see Johnson, supra note 8,
at 1185 (stating that ERISA fiduciaries and personal trust fiduciaries deal with two different
types of investment vehicles).
320. See Bobo, supra note 27, at 1098 (comparing pension and trust beneficiaries). Bobo
observed:
IThere is a distinct analogy to be drawn between income beneficiaries and retired
employees on the one hand and between remaindermen and active employees on
the other. The life beneficiary of a personal trust and retiree beneficiary of a
[pension] plan are stereotypically only interested in a steady, unchanging return;
the remaindermen of a personal trust and the employee presently contributing to the
[pension] plan place a higher priority on increasing the principal. Thus, the
differences among various fiduciaries regarding the basic principles that govern
their investment decisions are not so great
Id.
321. See td. at 1099 (noting that current interpretation of prudent investor rule could apply
generally to all fiduciary investments by incorporating flexible aspects and extracting inflexible
aspects of common and statutory law).
322. Cf. Ritchie, supra note 296, at 65 (suggesting that recent volatility in stock and bond
markets drives professional investors to explore different investment techmques to hedge
against loss in value as well as to obtain enhanced yield).
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